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The role played by internet and mobile phone services – access providers, social media etc – 
in the Arab Spring has been much discussed, including in academia. Whether these services 
were instrumental in the wave of revolutions that took over the Middle East and North Africa 
in 2011 has been widely studied. However, the question of how the firms behind these 
services reacted to the events, and why, has not been discussed. What factors explain that 
Online Service Providers adopted different attitudes to the Arab Spring? Drawing from 
political risk theory and research on business and peace, I propose a framework to analyse 
online service providers’ attitude, and factors that might offer an explanation. The study 
proposes a comparison between four firms’ attitude to the Arab Spring in Egypt, based on the 
qualitative analysis of their corporate communication. Two firms that did not communicate on 
the events are also included in the study, to better contrast results. I find that a combination of 
three factors explains their attitude: well-established corporate social responsibility policies 
and ethical principles (creed), prior experience of similar conflict abroad and in Egypt, and 
the combination of little to no assets in Egypt with the support of firms’ home country. The 
study highlights limits of political risk theory and theory of business and peace, which both 
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1 Introduction: the Arab Spring and online tools 
The Arab Spring, the wave of protests that hit the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
following the immolation of a street vendor in Tunisia in December 2010 and continued 
throughout 2011, was at the time hailed as a series of “Facebook Revolutions” or “Digital 
Revolutions” (Beaumont 2011). This was due to the perception that online tools (such as 
social media, email, etc…) played an important role during the protests, facilitating the 
mobilization of many protesters and the cascading of protests from Tunisia to Egypt, Libya 
and many other countries in the MENA region.  
Researchers have begun studying the role online tools can play in authoritarian 
regimes before these events, calling them “Liberation Technologies” (Diamond 2010). This 
stream of research into the uses and impacts of internet-enabled services continues, looking 
into how activists use such tools to organise (Howard and Hussain 2011; Manuel. Castells 
2015), how they change the balance of power between authoritarian regimes and citizens 
(Meier 2012), or how they are used to diffuse information beyond the region (Aday et al. 
2012). Another stream of research shows how online tools are also used as surveillance and 
propaganda tools by authoritarian regimes (Cattle 2015; Morozov 2012). Based on this 
research on the use of online tools during the Arab Spring, it appears that these tools were not 
used by a majority of protesters, but that they were mostly used to communicate about events 
to the outside world. Both Cattle and Morozov raise questions regarding the fact that online 
services used in the context of protests, and the Arab Spring, are in fact owned and 
administered by private companies.  
These firms, Online Service Providers (OSP), can be defined as “any company, 
organisation or group that provides an online service. These types of services may include 
Web sites, discussion forums, chat rooms, or Web mail. OSPs may also refer to a company 
that provides access to the Internet” (Wentrup and Ström 2017, 158). As presented above, 
little has been written on the role played by these companies during the Arab Spring: research 
has focused on the role played by the services firms provide. However, these services cannot 
be disconnected from the organizations that provide them: private firms, whose interest is to 
make profits. The academic fields focusing on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and 
business and human rights have just begun studying the role and impact of Online Service 





Research on business and peace focuses on how business can avoid fostering conflict 
and participate in building peace and supporting human rights. However, this field of research 
has focused mostly on specific industrial sectors, in particular extractive industries, which are 
asset-heavy (Ford 2015). Moreover, earlier studies of firms’ attitude to conflict have either 
focused on the behaviour of firms, not on factors that might explain it (Kolk and Lenfant 
2012), or on the factors influencing the possibility of such behaviour, not on their actual 
behaviour (Oetzel and Getz 2012). 
The question of how firms react to political events is certainly not a new one, as 
literature on political risk provides several ways to understand the issues firms face in foreign 
countries. The literature mostly concerns itself with the threats posed by changes in 
regulation, not violent conflict, and is interested in the moment of the decision to invest in a 
foreign country, not in how firms with ongoing operations react. However, OSPs are not 
necessarily asset-heavy: sometimes they did not have any physical presence in the region yet 
decided to engage with the events of the Arab Spring.  
Based on the short presentation above, there is clearly a gap in the academic literature 
with regards to the role of online service providers in conflict in general, and in the events of 
the Arab Spring in particular. This gap is especially important to fill, as the role of internet in 
the Arab Spring has been studied extensively: 247 peer-reviewed articles were published 
between 2011 and 2016 (Smidi and Shahin 2017), confirming the interest of academia on the 
topic.  
 
1.1 Research question 
Thus, I propose the following research question: What factors explain that Online Service 
Providers adopted different attitudes towards the Arab Spring? 
This research question implies that Online Service Providers adopted different 
attitudes to the Arab Spring. It is necessary to first investigate these attitudes before looking at 
factors that can explain them.  
Studying the phenomenon of the Arab Spring across the Middle East and North Africa 
is too large a task for a master’s thesis. A third of the studies of the Arab Spring focus on 
Egypt (Smidi and Shahin 2017, 201), which leads me to look deeper into the role played by 





Other justifications for focusing on Egypt in order to study OSPs’ role in the events 
are that no foreign intervention facilitated the departure of President Mubarak and the success 
of the revolution (Howard and Hussain 2013), and the fact that Egypt was the country with 
most internet users in the Arab world (Abdulla 2007; Howard and Hussain 2011), and with a 
comparatively large political blogosphere (Etling et al. 2010).  
In order to understand what factors explain OSPs’ attitudes towards the Arab Spring in 
Egypt, I, of course, have to study what attitude OSPs adopted during the events. The period 
under consideration in the following paper will be defined as 14 January 2011 until 21 March 
2011. 14 January marks the flight from his country of the former Tunisian President Ben Ali, 
who had resigned the day before. This date marks the start of the period under consideration, 
as Tunisia was a strong inspiration for Egyptians, especially after they heard of Ben Ali’s 
departure from his country (Ghonim 2012, 131–32). His departure marked the start of the 
organization of the first wave of protests in Egypt. Other researchers studying internet and the 
Arab Spring have also used that date as a starting point (Aday et al. 2013).  
I chose 21 March 2011 as the end of the period I will investigate, as on that date 
Egyptians voted in a referendum on constitutional changes, the first vote since the resignation 
of President Mubarak on 14 February (Chulov 2011). I could have chosen 14 February as an 
end-date, however, the Egyptian military announced its intention to maintain military rule, 
even after Mubarak’s departure (McGreal 2011). 21 March is also a good delimitation of the 
first wave of the Arab Spring in Egypt (there were other waves at the end of the summer 
2011, when military delayed the elections, and during the electoral campaign period until 
November 2011 (Blight, Pulham, and Torpey 2011).  
 
1.2 Thesis organization 
The thesis is built around six sections. Following this first section, the second section presents 
relevant literature, drawing from scholarship on corporate social responsibility, political risk 
and business and peace. The third section presents the methodology used to carry out the 
study of online service providers: comparative case study. It also introduces the selected cases 
and details how material was gathered. The fourth section offers a deeper dive into the 
material, analysing the attitude adopted by the firms during the Arab Spring in Egypt, as well 
as these firms’ characteristics. The fifth section discusses the results, offers some theoretical 





2 Theoretical framework 
Earlier research in the fields of corporate social responsibility, of political risk, and of 
business and peace provides a useful background to investigate OSPs’ reaction to the Arab 
Spring. The first section proposes a definition of Online Service Providers and briefly outlines 
their responsibilities with regards to human rights. In the second section, I discuss scholarship 
on political risk, in order to shed light on how OSPs might analyse and manage the risks 
presented by violent conflict. Then I present research on business and peace, and finally, in 
the fourth section, I propose a framework to analyse OSPs attitude to the Arab Spring in 
Egypt, along with potential factors that might have influenced them. 
 
2.1 Online Service Providers: a specific type of company with specific 
responsibilities 
This section proposes a definition of Online Service Providers, before showing that these 
firms have specific responsibilities with regards to human rights.  
2.1.1 Characteristics of Online Service Providers 
Online Service Providers (OSPs), also sometimes called intermediaries (La Rue 2011, 11), are 
rarely defined by researchers. Current definitions of OSPs often remain vague, based on 
examples (MacKinnon et al. 2014; Taddeo and Floridi 2015). Wentrup and Ström (2017, 158) 
base their definition of OSP on Webopedia (2015) and define them as “any company, 
organisation or group that provides an online service. These types of services may include 
Web sites, discussion forums, chat rooms, or Web mail. OSPs may also refer to a company 
that provides access to the Internet”. They also identify a few characteristics of OSPs: they 
have a geographically wide user base while their operations often remain highly concentrated 
to a few locations in the West, and they are totally dependent on internet access. They are not 
dependent on being physically present in an area to have users there. 
Hence, Online Service Providers are most often removed from conflict areas, in that 
they do not have physical assets or operations in conflict areas – or at least do not need to 
have a physical presence to continue operating in these areas. OSPs operate throughout the 





only in areas affected by conflict. In this, OSPs differ greatly from extractive industries, 
which are most often mentioned and studied under the concept of Business and Peace1. 
The business model of OSPs is often very different from other industries: there is no 
financial transaction between most OSPs and their users. The service is provided for free in 
exchange for the users’ data, which are then sold to marketing companies or used to sell 
advertising space to other businesses (Cattle 2015; Wentrup and Ström 2017) and raises 
human rights questions, especially with regards to private data these companies can be asked 
to transfer over by governments (Laidlaw 2017, 146–47) . 
Finally, Online Service Providers do enable and even administer “citizenship rights”, 
as demonstrated by Bauer (2014, 267–73). Citizens use online services to inform themselves 
and share information, to organise and protest, in sum to exercise their civil and political 
rights. OSPs are then in effect administering the way citizens exercise these rights, which can 
create problems, for example, when Facebook’s terms of use require users to use their real 
identity instead of a pseudonym. Activists in authoritarian regimes then have to circumvent 
the OSP’s policy in order to ensure their security – thus risking exclusion from the service 
(Cattle 2015, 446).  
 
2.1.2 Business and Human Rights 
Among the characteristics of OSPs identified above, the fact that they administer human 
rights calls for further discussion. Indeed, Broeders and Taylor (2017) demonstrate how OSP 
enjoy great powers: they have more users than some states have citizens, they provide most of 
the communication infrastructure, and they also organise speech across states’ borders: the 
power of OSPs has “political and foreign dimensions” (Broeders and Taylor 2017, 316). The 
authors also highlight how OSPs shape the information society – sometimes in agreement 
with governments and sometimes in opposition to them – and how they shape what 
information citizens and governments receive and how they receive it, meaning that OSPs 
have great political power, and great social responsibilities (Broeders and Taylor 2017, 319).  
This, as well as the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection 
of the right to freedom of opinion and expression (La Rue 2011, secs. 47 & 76), confirm that 
                                                 





the framework Protect – Respect – Remedy (Ruggie 2008) should inform research on how 
Online Service Providers reacted to the Arab Spring. Freedom to access to internet is a human 
right (La Rue 2011). The Report of the Special Rapporteur was published in May 2011, just 
after the events of the Arab Spring in Egypt. To write this report, the rapporteur visited Cairo, 
Egypt, on 11-13 January 2011, in order to consult regional experts. Thus, the report was not 
available to OSPs at the time of the events in Egypt, but it does reflect ongoing thinking on 
issues of internet and freedom of expression.  
The Protect-Respect-Remedy framework describes how states have the responsibility 
to protect human rights, but firms have the responsibility to respect human rights, and should 
not make themselves complicit of human rights abuses (Ruggie 2008). Following Ruggie’s 
framework, states have the primary responsibility to remedy human rights abuses, but 
business should also provide access to grievance mechanisms. Ruggie also note the existence 
of initiatives promoting standards of practice, such as the UN Global Compact. 
The UN Global Compact was launched in 2000 (Annan 2000). Signatory companies 
pledge that they will respect ten principles of sustainability, including human rights, and that 
they will promote the Sustainable Development Goals (Our Mission n.d.). Since then the 
Global Compact has released a series of guidelines for companies, including with regards to 
violent conflict (UN Global Compact 2010).  
Other relevant guidelines are the 2000 OECD Principles for Multinational Enterprises 
(OECD 2008), which were relevant at the time of the Arab Spring. the updated OECD 
Principles (2011) and the Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (United Nations 
2011) were published as the Arab Spring unfolded in the region, but after the period under 
analysis  (they were adopted in May and June 2011, respectively) – hence an analysis of 
OSPs’ reaction to the events cannot be based entirely on these.  
Both the 2000 OECD Principles and the Protect-Respect-Remedy framework 
emphasize that corporations have to respect the human rights guaranteed in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and in the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. Both the OECD Principles and the Protect – Respect - Remedy 
framework are soft law: they do not bind corporations legally, although their application is 
encouraged.  
Work presented here shows how OSPs have responsibilities, which are intimately tied 





find here justification to investigate how OSPs reacted to the Arab Spring. The OECD 
Principles and the Protect – Respect – Remedy framework should inform such an 
investigation, and mention of these principles by firms as well as their participation to 
initiatives such as the Global Compact might give an indication on their attitude towards the 
Arab Spring.  
 
2.2 Political risk 
“The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits”, according to Friedman (1970). 
Since then, the literature on international business has studied how corporations have adopted 
political behaviours, sometimes becoming political actors (Scherer, Palazzo, and Matten 
2014), providing public goods, including ones that are normally only provided by sovereign 
states, such as security (Wolf, Deitelhoff, and Engert 2007), and engaging in philanthropic 
activities. But what are the motivations behind such engagement, which goes so far beyond 
Friedman’s assertion? An answer is offered by the literature on political risk: political 
behaviours, including philanthropy and social responsibility initiatives, are among the 
strategies used by firms to manage political risk (Boddewyn and Brewer 1994). 
 Following a section defining political risk, I draw upon literature analysing political 
risk and how firms manage such risk. A final section highlights the specificities of domestic 
firms facing political risk. 
 
2.2.1 Defining political risk 
The literature on political risk provides theories to understand multinational enterprises’ 
(MNE) attitude to political events. Political events can impact MNEs in three aspects: they 
can affect their capacity to transfer capital, technology, or people; their ability to operate; and 
their ability to own and manage their assets in the host country (Kobrin 1979, 68). Political 
risk is industry- and firm-specific, as not all industries are affected in the same way by 
political events, and as not all firms are similarly vulnerable to political events.  
Political risk can be understood in a broad way as any political event that affects a firm, 
from changes in regulations to violent conflict (Boddewyn and Brewer 1994; Kobrin 1979). 
Miller (1992) uses a narrower definition that separates political risk (changes in government, 





social risk (for examples riots – this describes events related to a population disagreeing with 
the government). For this paper, a broader understanding of political risk will be assumed, as 
in the case of the Arab Spring in Egypt, social risk (the opposition of the population to its 
government) led to a revolution, which ultimately resulted in a change in government.   
Based on this definition of political risk, political events such as the Arab Spring can 
affect business’ ability to operate, transfer and own assets in the affected country. This 
definition seems to limit itself to firms that have assets and operate in the affected country, the 
host country. What about industries that do not rely on heavy in-country assets? 
 
2.2.2 Analysing political risk 
Research on political risk has mostly focused on the investment stage – when multinationals 
consider whether to go ahead with foreign direct investments (FDI) in a host country (Hood 
and Nawaz 2004; John and Lawton 2017; Oetzel, Getz, and Ladek 2007), or on later stages, 
when firms decide to exit (Dai, Eden, and Beamish 2017). 
Theory based on bargaining power considers that firms and governments each have 
something the other is interested in. For a firm, bargaining power is at its highest before entry 
in the host country, and this is thus when political risk is at its lowest (Stevens, Xie, and Peng 
2016). Oetzel, Getz and Ladek (2007) highlight how bargaining power theory does also allow 
for analysing a firm’s exposure to political risk beyond the investment stage, after a firm has 
made its first investments. They insist on the fact that most investments are at least of a 
medium to long-term nature, especially in manufacturing, infrastructure and extractive 
industries. Beyond negotiations with the host government regarding business operations, 
bargaining-power theory also explains firms’ political behaviour, including during political 
events such as revolution and conflict (Boddewyn and Brewer 1994).  
Stevens, Xie and Peng (2016), however, identify limits to the bargaining-power theory.  
Research on political risk has long focused on asset-heavy sectors such as extractive 
industries and manufacturing, but do not account for the specificities of the service industry, 
which comparatively has little assets in a host country. Because the service industry involves 
little in-country assets, a lot less interests are engaged in the host country, and hence the 





theory. They introduce legitimacy as another paradigm for firms to understand and manage 
political risk.  
The legitimacy-based approach fills the gap left by separating the notions of home 
country and host country: firms face numerous demands from stakeholders both at home, in 
the host country, and even globally (Windsor 2007). If a firm’s actions and attributes are seen 
as “desirable, proper or appropriate” (Suchman 1995, 574) it will gain legitimacy to operate in 
the eyes of society and government. Three types of organizational legitimacy are generally 
identified: cognitive (when an organization is taken for granted), pragmatic (when an 
organization benefits the evaluator) and moral (when an organization’s norms are seen as 
positive) (Bitektine 2011; Suchman 1995). Both pragmatic and moral legitimacy are fluid 
concepts: they are constantly being evaluated by stakeholders. 
A firm’s legitimacy is not universal: a firm can be seen as legitimate at home, and not in 
the host country, or vice versa. A firm can also have legitimacy in the eyes of a government 
but not in the eyes of society at large, if the government itself is not seen as legitimate. If a 
firm derives its local legitimacy solely from the government, and that government is 
perceived as illegitimate, the firm’s legitimacy in the eyes of society at large will be very 
weak (Darendeli and Hill 2015). 
According to Stevens, Xie and Peng, the question of the legitimacy of firms and 
governments in the eyes of society help understand why a government might intervene in a 
firm’s operations (and thus how a firm might be exposed to political risk). The authors 
demonstrate that in order to analyse a firm’s exposure to political risk, one needs to look into 
the firm’s legitimacy in the eyes of the host society, and in those of its home society, as well 
as into its legitimacy in the eyes of both home and host governments. One also needs to take 
into account the legitimacy of home and host governments. The legitimacy-based approach to 
political risk allows for understanding that the service industry, including search engines and 
telecom, also face political risk (Stevens, Xie, and Peng 2016), which they have to manage 
both at home and in the host country.  
However, Stevens et al (2016) consider that governments who see firms as legitimate 
will not intervene in their operations. They also consider that even if a government sees a firm 
as illegitimate, it won’t intervene in its activities if the firm is seen as legitimate by society. 





authorities disrupted activities of firms that operated in joint venture with a state-owned firm, 
and also intervened in activities of firms that were seen as legitimate by society.  
The case of OSPs’ attitude to the Arab Spring in Egypt calls for pushing further this 
understanding of political risk based on legitimacy: firms are exposed to political risk existing 
both in the host country and in the home country. This implies that firms are exposed to 
political risk in a host country where they have assets. However, some OSPs did not have any 
assets in Egypt at the time. Yet, they still engaged with the conflict in Egypt. Thus, it seems 
that OSPs need to manage political risk also in areas where they are not physically present, 
which a legitimacy-based approach might explain: in Egypt, some OSPs might have acted in 
order to maintain their legitimacy in the eyes of their “home” society and home government, 
in which case such factors as headquarter location might have influenced their attitude. 
However, the relationship between firm legitimacy in the eyes of government, firm legitimacy 
in the eyes of society and political risk needs to be further explored, as the example of OSPs 
in Egypt appears to contradict Stevens, Xie and Peng’s argument (2016). 
 
2.2.3 Managing political risk 
To limit the impact of political events on their activities, firms need to take mitigating 
measures.  Literature regarding how firms do manage the political risks they are exposed to is 
less abundant. Theoretical approaches can be found among studies of business-government 
relations. Boddewyn and Bewer (1994) suggest a framework to describe the behaviours firms 
adopt towards their host government. Firms can be non-bargaining or bargaining, meaning 
firms can choose avoidance (and exit the host country), compliance or circumvention 
(sometimes illegally) of government’s regulations, and thus not engage with their host 
government. They can also decide to adopt a bargaining strategy and engage with the 
government, either partnering or entering into conflict with it. This theory is based on 
bargaining-power and assumes that firms which have power in the eyes of the host 
government will decide to engage with it and adopt a bargaining behaviour, whereas firms 
enjoying less power will refrain from bargaining.   
However, this typology of possible strategies of business-government relations does 
not completely explain how firms manage political risk: it focuses on relations with the host 
government, neglecting other stakeholders (such as the civil society or rebel groups). It does 





different types of political risk, and it does not help with understanding which factors impact a 
firm’s decision to engage with political events, or not. The fact that Online Service Providers 
that had little to no assets in Egypt decided to engage in favour of peace and human rights 
contradicts the premise that firms engage with a host country. It also questions the assumption 
that these firms did not face political risk in Egypt, since they decided to engage with the 
conflict. It seems that contrary to what Boddewyn and Brewer argue (1994), firms adopt 
political behaviours also in country where they have little to no assets. This challenges the 
theory that firms that have power in the eyes of a government will engage in bargaining 
behaviour with that government.  
Others have studied the political behaviours firms adopt to manage different types of 
political risk, but these studies mostly take into account a single risk factor: government 
regulations (Keillor, Wilkinson, and Owens 2005). They focus on firms’ capacity to transfer 
and own assets, and on how host governments can decide to limit this capacity.  
Few do focus on risks that go beyond changes in regulations, such as protests, 
revolution or violent conflict. Some have focused on MNE’s decision to exit (or stay in) the 
host country when it faces war (Dai, Eden, and Beamish 2017), showing that MNEs with 
prior experience of risky situations and more resources exposed to war are less likely to exit 
the host country than similarly exposed MNEs with less experience. However, firms with less 
assets in-country tend to exit, regardless of prior experience. This study does not account for 
the attitude MNEs adopt once they decide to remain in the country. Does prior experience of 
conflict affect the attitude firms adopt through a new conflict? 
Oetzel and Getz (2012) investigate how firms might react to violent conflict, and the 
factors that would affect their behaviour. They find that firms (local and multinationals) 
would react directly to violent conflict under the pressure of local stakeholders, while 
international stakeholders’ pressure would push firms to act more indirectly. Interestingly, 
they find out that firms in the utilities industry (including transportation, utilities and 
communication) are less likely than other firms to respond directly to violent conflict, as well 
as indirectly and unilaterally. The response strategies under consideration are direct and 
collaborative, direct and unilateral, indirect and collaborative and indirect and unilateral 
(Oetzel, Getz, and Ladek 2007). A direct approach is when a firm tries to influence parties to 
the conflict, for example by lobbying with the government, by speaking out publicly, or by 





populations’ sufferings and/or addressing root causes to the conflict. Firms can decide to act 
alone or collaborate with other organizations (firms or NGOs for example). 
However, the study is based on a survey among companies who have signed the UN 
Global Compact, and on the hypothetical way they might respond to a violent conflict, not on 
firms’ responses to actual conflict. Moreover, the study focuses on the role of stakeholder 
pressure on the strategies firms might adopt. Other factors might come into play, such as prior 
experience of violent conflict, localisation of headquarters, etc… If their study demonstrates 
that firms participating in the UN Global Compact are willing to respond to conflict and to 
foster peace, the fact that it is based on how firms might react to violent conflict does limit the 
generalizability of its results. In Egypt, Online Service Providers who were involved in the 
UN Global Compact did not adopt behaviours aiming at fostering peace, which challenges 
Oetzel and Getz’s findings (2012).  
Darendeli and Hill (2015) look into how Turkish construction firms engaged in Libya 
survived to the events of the Arab Spring, and the fall of Qadhafi’s regime. They show how 
the firms that survived the conflict, and the change in government, were pursuing pragmatic 
and moral legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders beyond the host government prior to the 
events. Firms that had developed connections to local tribes prior to the events (ensuring a 
form of moral legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders) and firms that were working on projects 
of public interest (such as infrastructure, construction of public universities and hospitals) and 
thus enjoying a form of pragmatic legitimacy survived the turmoil better that others. Thus, the 
legitimacy-based approach helps understand the political risk faced by firms during the Arab 
Spring in Libya, and likely in Egypt, too.  
 
2.2.4 A note on domestic firms and political risk 
Most of the literature on political risk focuses on multinational enterprises and how they relate 
to political events and engage with governments and stakeholders, thus neglecting to consider 
how domestic firms face uncertainty and are impacted by political events. Because domestic 
firms do not have the competence and experience MNEs have acquired, nor the same 
resources (Luo and Tan 1998), they do not perceive and tackle political risk in the same way 
(Eden and Miller 2004; Luo and Tan 1998; Zaheer 1995). But where MNEs suffer from a 
liability of foreignness, meaning that they face challenges linked to their lack of knowledge of 





for domestic firms (Wöcke and Moodley 2015; Zaheer 1995), domestic firms beneficiate from 
a better understanding of their environment and better networks (Eden and Miller 2004).  
However, some research seems to show that domestic firms and MNEs do not differ as 
greatly as expected in the way they handle political risk in the form of regulatory uncertainty 
(Wöcke and Moodley 2015). Domestic firms are more likely than MNE to adopt an avoidance 
strategy in the face of regulatory adversity – but it is about the only difference identified by 
the authors. The authors however highlight that they study the health sector in South Africa – 
an industry in which MNEs have actually been present in the country for much longer than 
domestic firms. 
 
In sum, theory of firms’ political behaviour based on a bargaining-power approach of 
political risk appears to be challenged by the example of Online Service Providers in Egypt. 
Boddewyn and Brewer’s argument that firms that have power in the eyes of a government 
will engage in bargaining behaviour with that government (1994) seems challenged by the 
fact that some OSPs engaged with the conflict in Egypt despite being absent from the country. 
If the legitimacy-based approach to political risk proposes a broader understanding of political 
risk – both in host and home country (Stevens, Xie, and Peng 2016), it is still limited by the 
fact that firms’ in-country presence is assumed. Moreover, Stevens, Xie and Peng’s argument 
that a government will not disrupt operations of firms that are seen as legitimate by society 
seems to be challenged by the example of OSPs in Egypt.  Literature on political risk has also 
mostly failed to analyse how firms operate while facing a conflict situation. Oetzel and Getz’s 
findings in their study of how firms might react to conflict indicate that the firms surveyed – 
all part of the UN Global Compact – are willing to react strategically to conflict.  However, 
some OSPs, members of the UN Global Compact, did not adopt such strategy. Thus, it makes 
sense to turn to literature on business and peace, in order to get a better understanding of how 
firms operate under conflict situations, and what factors might explain the way they engage 
with such events.  
 
2.3 Business and conflict, business and peace 
Research on business and peace provides indications regarding how to understand OSPs’ 





peace. Then I introduce the different ways business can influence peace, as identified by 
earlier research. Finally, I look into how firms’ attitude towards conflict can be studied. 
2.3.1 Defining peace 
Beyond respecting human rights, business can influence peace. Peace in my research is 
understood in a maximalist definition as the absence of violence, combined with human rights 
and participatory government (Oetzel et al. 2009, 355).  
Although research on business and peace tends to define peace as the absence of 
violence, the broader definition adopted here allows for consideration of events during the 
Arab Spring regardless of the level of bloodshed, especially as Arab Spring-related events are 
considered as conflict (Conflict Barometer 2011). Using the broader definition of peace does 
not break with the tradition, as many researchers advocate for such a broad understanding of 
peace (Galtung 1969; Gleditsch, Nordkvelle, and Strand 2014, 155; Oetzel and Miklian 
2017). Based on this definition, pro-peace activities include the defence of human rights. 
By considering the Arab Spring in this way, I can then turn to research on business 
and peace, which will allow me to further study how OSPs reacted to the Arab Spring.  
 
2.3.2 Why business and peace? 
Going back to Friedman’s argument that “The social responsibility of business is to increase 
its profits” (1970), why are firms interested in fostering peace? Under which circumstances 
are they “expected, willing and motivated to contribute to a specific public governance 
function, namely, peace and security”? (Jamali and Mirshak 2010, 444). This question is 
particularly relevant as firms, when facing conflict, are mostly concerned about being able to 
continue operating through the conflict, and being seen as neutral (Jamali and Mirshak 2010). 
The motivations of firms that decide to foster peace might be explained by “need, 
creed, and greed” (Rettberg 2016). Firms need peaceful conditions to maintain and develop 
their activities; this is what Rettberg defines as “need”. A business’s “creed” is its ideology, or 
ethical belief. Businesses with a portfolio of CSR activities, or with strong ethics are more 
likely to act for peace. With “greed”, Rettberg means that by fostering peace, a firm will gain 
competitive advantage to increase its profits. However, the notions of “need” and “greed” can 
also explain that some firms do not engage in peacebuilding activities. Some firms do benefit 





In the vein of what Rettberg identifies as “need”, the previous section on firms and 
political risk has shown how firms facing political risk, including violent conflict, adopt 
strategies to mitigate events’ impact on their operations. Unless firms decide to withdraw 
from a conflict situation, risk management strategies may include engaging with conflict’s 
actors, root causes for the conflict or populations affected by the conflict, and thus possibly 
fostering peace, so that activities can be maintained (and developed). Thus peacebuilding 
activities are among the strategies firms adopt to manage political risk (Oetzel and Miklian 
2017). Businesses adopting peacebuilding strategies in that case consider peace as an 
“instrumental benefit” (Fort 2015, 120). 
Under “creed”, Rettberg takes into account both firms with a pro-peace ideology, 
similarly to Fort’s “peace entrepreneurs” (Fort 2014, 110, 2015, 100), and firms that carry out 
CSR activities. The question of CSR activities is however not necessarily part of what Fort 
calls “peace entrepreneurship”. CSR activities, following Fort, should be rather considered 
part of ethics businesses apply because they are now a norm. Fort thus describes a third type 
of peacebuilding firms; firms building peace without realizing it, because they follow well-
established norms while continuing business as usual (Fort 2014, 111). Analysing Online 
Service Providers’ attitude might confirm that CSR policies have become a norm, and thus are 
not a determinant of a pro-peace attitude.  
As highlighted in section 2.1, responsibilities are assigned to business with regards to 
human rights. Because firms have a responsibility to protect human rights, and because these 
human rights are a part of peace, firms have a responsibility to “do no harm”, if not foster 
peace. Because OSPs have great power over citizenship rights, they should make sure that 
they do not fuel conflict, and that they foster peace. However, other researchers warn of the 
important criticism that business is not a democratic actor, and thus that for a firm to engage 
in activities going beyond conflict-sensitive practices might be taking too much responsibility 
(Ford 2015). Ford insists on the fact that the role of the state matters, and that firms filling 
governance gap take on too big a role.  
It is important to note that most firms seem to be very worried about being associated 
with peacebuilding (Jamali and Mirshak 2010). Most are focussed on continuing their 
operations through conflict, not on fostering peace, which the study of OSPs in Egypt might 
confirm. The study could also confirm Rettberg’s theory (2016) that a combination of need, 
greed and creed motivates firms to engage in favour of peace. Such a combination might 





2.3.3 How can business foster peace? 
A lot of research has focused on how business can foster peace, both from an academic and 
from a practitioner’s perspective. Research has identified four to five general ways in which 
firms can influence peace.  
First, firms foster economic growth, which itself fosters peace (Forrer, Fort, and Gilpin 
2012, 4–5; Miklian 2016, 11; Oetzel et al. 2009, 362). Simply by being there and carrying out 
their activities, firms foster peace.  
Second, they can foster peace through developing local economies and local 
capabilities, either because they use local contractors or via development projects they 
implement in the context of corporate social responsibility (CSR). This fosters peace as it 
creates a sense of community (Forrer, Fort, and Gilpin 2012, 5; Oetzel et al. 2009, 365), but is 
also criticized as CSR policies are often seen as opportunistic and sometimes lead to conflict 
between communities (Miklian 2016, 12).   
Third, firms influence peace by implementing international norms and adopting 
external evaluation tools (Fort 2015; Miklian 2016, 15; Oetzel et al. 2009, 364). For example, 
firms that respect human rights and implement transparency standards, and report on these, 
demonstrate the benefits of peaceful and democratic behaviour, and hence foster peace.  
Business also foster peace through conflict-sensitive practices, such as avoiding to 
finance a party to the conflict, or by addressing the root causes of the conflict (Forrer, Fort, 
and Gilpin 2012; Miklian 2016, 18; Oetzel et al. 2009, 367).  
Finally, firms can influence peace through track-two diplomacy, meaning by 
participating in or facilitating multi-stakeholders negotiations (Forrer, Fort, and Gilpin 2012; 
Miklian 2016, 20; Oetzel et al. 2009, 366).  
These five ways of influence of business on peace do provide a framework to analyse 
Online Service Providers’ activities during the Arab Spring in Egypt, especially the last two 
ones, as they imply that firms can go beyond their usual way of operating when facing a 
conflict. Oetzel et al (2009, 369) also suggest that further research should focus on 
understanding which firms’ characteristics make them more likely to engage in peace-
fostering practices. Thus, analysing OSPs’ reactions during the Arab Spring in Egypt makes 






2.4 Analysing firms’ attitude towards conflict and peace 
This section draws on literature discussed above to offer a framework to analyse firms’ 
attitude first, and then characteristics which might explain the attitude firms adopted.  
 
2.4.1 Frameworks to describe firms’ attitude 
Wolf et al (2007) propose a framework identifying four forms for a firm to engage with 
conflict: take advantage, business as usual, withdrawal, and “proactive engagement”. A firm 
takes advantage of a conflict, and engages in profiteering, when it benefits from the conflict, 
and supports the continuation of the conflict. By withdrawing, a firm avoids possibly fuelling 
conflict, and removes itself from a difficult situation, avoiding further consequences on its 
personnel and operations, as seen in section 1.2 on political risk. Business as usual and 
“proactive engagement” should be understood as either in “words” - i.e. public commitments - 
or “deeds” - actions in a conflict - (Wolf, Deitelhoff, and Engert 2007). Firms can maintain 
business as usual, or engage proactively in favour of peace, by communicating their 
commitments. Alternatively, firms engage proactively or maintain business as usual in their 
actions.  
Jamali and Mirshak (2010) offer an overview of how firms engage with conflict based 
on prior research in the academic fields of international business political behaviour and of 
business & society, and on practitioners’ literature. Their proposed framework is reproduced 
on the next page (figure 1). The framework places firms’ strategies with regards to conflict on 
a continuum, from a coping strategy to a conflict-resolution strategy. It shows the parallels 
between the different streams of research they take into account. Rows 1 and 2 come from the 
literature on political behaviour, whereas row 3 comes from practitioners’ perspective and 
row 4 is the framework identified by Wolf et al (2007). However, as Jamali and Mirshak 
(2010) themselves note, the different classifications suggested do not strictly overlap.   
In fact, strategies presented in row 1 & 4 (avoidance, withdrawal and profiteering) do 
not overlap with row 2 & 3 (passive reaction and compliance). Compliance and passive 
reaction could rather be considered as “business as usual” in the words of Wolf et al (2007). 
Moreover, the proposed framework remains general, describing strategies but not really 





account the distinctions between words and deeds (Wolf, Deitelhoff, and Engert 2007), 
between indirect and direct actions (Oetzel and Getz 2012; Oetzel, Getz, and Ladek 2007).  
 
 
Attempts at investigating how firms react to conflict using the frameworks presented 
above have been made. In particular, Kolk and Lenfant (2012) have used a framework 
inspired from these suggestions. They evaluate how companies react to conflict: are they 
avoidant, do they use a “business as usual” strategy or do they adopt strategies to facilitate 
conflict resolution? Kolk and Lenfant developed this framework to study multinational 
companies’ standing to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in the 
context of a wider study looking into how multinational companies collaborate with non-
governmental organisations in DRC. For this study, the scholars consider firms to be 
“avoidant” if they do not provide any information on the conflict on their website or in 
reports, and if they have not answered the study questionnaire. “Business as usual firms” are 
firms that, despite disclosing some information (in their own reporting or in the 
questionnaire), are not specific about the conflict in DRC. “Conflict resolution” firms are 
those who are more specific with regards to the conflict and their possible role in the conflict, 
either in their reporting or in their answers to the questionnaire. This shows the difficulties of 
studying firms’ attitude to a conflict, as Kolk and Lenfant take into account what firms say, 
but not necessarily their activities. As they note themselves, these categories are rigid, 





whereas placing firms’ attitudes to the conflict on a continuum would provide a more precise 
understanding of the situation.  
Analysing each firm’s attitude based on the typology of activities presented in section 
2.3.3 will allow for more granularity. Taking into account firms’ engagement in words and 
deeds (Wolf, Deitelhoff, and Engert 2007) and directedness or indirectedness of their 
engagement (Oetzel and Getz 2012) will draw a more comprehensive picture of their attitude. 
Thus, I propose a continuum from taking advantage through to proactive engagement based 
on the work of Wolf et al (2007) and Jamali and Mirshak (2010). In order to place firms on 
this continuum, their activities during a conflict should be considered according to the 
typology of peace-fostering behaviours, taking into account whether each firm used words or 
actions.  
 
2.4.2 Factors influencing firms 
Based on scholarship presented earlier in this chapter, a series of factors should be included 
while studying firms’ attitude towards conflict and peace. Based on bargaining-power theory, 
one should include firm size, firm ownership form, the level of a firm’s presence in the 
conflict zone, the location of firm’s headquarters, and the type of product or service offered. 
Legitimacy-based approach to political risk suggests that further factors influence firms’ 
attitude to conflict: product/service visibility, and existing CSR practices and ethical 
engagement. Furthermore, firm prior experience in the country and of conflict should be 
considered. 
Some consider that smaller firms might be more likely to foster peace in their day-to-
day operations, as they contribute directly to the local economy, whereas multinationals, due 
to their size and resources, have likely more influence on local government and communities 
(Forrer, Fort, and Gilpin 2012; Nelson 2000). Others suggest that small and medium-sized 
firms have fewer incentives to adopt a peace-fostering attitude because they face little 
reputational cost: they are less visible. Big multinationals are thus more likely to engage in 
conflict-resolution activities (Wolf, Deitelhoff, and Engert 2007). Moreover, bargaining-
power theory highlights that bigger firms have more power over governments than smaller 
firms, and are thus more likely to engage with a government (Boddewyn and Brewer 1994). 
In particular, firms with more than hundred employees are more likely to adopt a strategic 





power theory and business and peace theories, multinationals have the means and opportunity 
to engage with both government and local stakeholders in order to support peace.  
State-owned firms are likely to be used as a tool for foreign diplomacy by their owner 
(Forrer, Fort, and Gilpin 2012). Family-owned companies, because they can be related to 
identified persons, are more likely to try and foster peace than publicly-traded firms (Wolf, 
Deitelhoff, and Engert 2007). Oetzel and Getz (2012) do not identify any significant 
difference between publicly-held firms and privately-held firms. 
Other factors identified as relevant involve the presence of assets and offices in the 
conflict zone (Wolf, Deitelhoff, and Engert 2007). Local presence is an incentive for firms to 
engage with the situation, as firms find themselves impacted (Dai, Eden, and Beamish 2017; 
Oetzel and Getz 2012). Firms heavily involved in a conflict zone enjoy more bargaining 
power (Boddewyn and Brewer 1994) and a higher level of legitimacy (Oetzel, Getz, and 
Ladek 2007) which make them more likely to respond strategically to conflict and adopt 
peacebuilding strategies.  
Location of headquarters is another factor identified as important, as pressure from the 
home country would push firms to engage in peacebuilding behaviours (Oetzel and Getz 
2012; Wolf, Deitelhoff, and Engert 2007); a firm’s home country also impacts a firm’s 
legitimacy (Stevens, Xie, and Peng 2016). 
The type of product or service offered by a firm can also influence the risk it faces 
during a conflict, and thus its attitude towards the conflict. Firms offering public services and 
infrastructure enjoy a higher level of legitimacy in the eyes of a conflict-torn society 
(Darendeli and Hill 2015), and more bargaining power. If the product or service is visible, 
locally and internationally, a firm will be pressed to engage in peacebuilding in order to 
maintain its legitimacy (Oetzel and Getz 2012; Oetzel, Getz, and Ladek 2007; Wolf, 
Deitelhoff, and Engert 2007).  
As highlighted by Rettberg (2016), firms’ “creed” also influence their attitude towards 
peace, and manifest itself through a strongly defined ethic line, public ethical engagement and 
Corporate Social Responsibility programmes. Firms displaying these characteristics are more 
likely to engage in peacebuilding (Oetzel, Getz, and Ladek 2007; Wolf, Deitelhoff, and 
Engert 2007).  
Literature on political risk also invites the consideration of two other factors: firms’ 





Eden, and Beamish 2017; Oh and Oetzel 2017). Dai et al (2017) show that firms with prior 
conflict experience tend to exit conflict zones, unless they have important assets in the area. 
Oh and Oetzel (2017) show that firms with prior conflict experience will not expand in a 
conflict zone, unless they have prior experience of conflict in the country. Conflict experience 
and country experience might be relevant when studying OSPs’ attitude towards the Arab 
Spring in Egypt, as not all OSPs who engaged with the events had a physical presence Egypt.  
Other factors influencing firms’ attitude to conflict and peace include the type of 
conflict (Forrer, Fort, and Gilpin 2012; Wolf, Deitelhoff, and Engert 2007), but in the case of 
a study of firms reaction to a single conflict – the Arab Spring in Egypt – this is not relevant. 
Similarly, although the type of industry is considered as an important factor by some (Forrer, 
Fort, and Gilpin 2012; Nelson 2000), because this paper focuses on a single sector – that of 
online services – this factor will not be taken into account beyond the different types of 






This section presents the methodology used to carry out the study, focusing first on the 
design, then on the conceptualization and operationalization of the variables. The process of 
case selection is then discussed. The next section introduces how material was gathered and 
analysed. I finally offer reflections on the validity and reliability of the study. 
 
3.1 Design: comparative case study 
Understanding what factors explain that OSPs adopted different attitudes to the Arab Spring 
in Egypt required I gain deeper knowledge of OSPs’ attitude during the Arab Spring in Egypt, 
and of each OSP’s characteristics. This put my research in the realm of case studies (Ringdal 
2013, 170–71). Even though my research question “What factors explain that Online Service 
Providers adopted different attitudes towards the Arab Spring in Egypt” is not a “how or why 
question” (Yin 2013, 10), it remains explanatory in nature, aiming to identify characteristics 
that might explain OSPs’ attitude to the events. Furthermore, it is a more detailed version of 
the wider “How did OSP react to the Arab Spring, and why?”. Thus, case study is a relevant 
method. 
As OSPs are very diverse companies, covering very different types of services such as 
internet access, social media or search engines (Wentrup and Ström 2017), I needed to study 
more than a single company. Comparing multiple cases allows for considering firms with 
different characteristics, especially as literature presented in section 2.4.2 identifies a series of 
firm’s characteristics that can explain its attitude to conflict. Using a comparative design 
makes it possible to highlight commonalities and differences between the different cases, and 
to build upon existing theory.  
 
3.2 Conceptualization & Operationalization 
In order to answer to the question “What factors explain that Online Service Providers 
adopted different attitudes towards the Arab Spring?” I proceeded in two steps. The first step 
consisted in identifying which attitude each OSP adopted towards the events of the Arab 





each OSP, and might thus explain their different attitude, based on the literature presented in 
section 2. 
3.2.1 Dependent variable: OSPs’ attitude the Arab Spring in Egypt 
In order to analyse OSPs’ attitude to the Arab Spring, I have used a framework based in the 
theory exposed in section 2.4.1. Following Wolf et al (2007), Jamali and Mirshak (2010) and 
Kolk and Lenfant (2012), I have differentiated between firms that were avoidant, firms that 
carried out business as usual and firms that adopted a form of engagement.  
To gain more granularity in my understanding of OSPs’ attitude, I have distinguished 
between firms that engaged with the events in words - by communicating - or deeds - by 
taking action - in favour of peace. Peace is here understood as positive peace, i.e. the absence 
of violence combined with human rights, as presented in section 2.3.1. For further granularity, 
I have looked into whether firms acted indirectly or directly, and whether they acted 
collaboratively or unilaterally (Oetzel and Getz 2012; Oetzel, Getz, and Ladek 2007). This 























Following the framework used by Kolk and Lenfant (2012), firms that do not mention 
the events of the Arab Spring in Egypt, either in their own communication (reports, press 
releases, institutional blogs) or via interviews are considered as avoidant. Firms that mention 
the events of the Arab Spring in their communication, but that do not take position in favour 
of peace are considered as adopting the attitude of business as usual. Firms that mention a 
position in favour of peace are considered as engaging for peace.  
That engagement was then evaluated, to see whether it was in words, or deeds (if the 
firm takes specific measures, beyond communicating its support for peace) (Wolf, Deitelhoff, 
and Engert 2007).  
The forms of engagement were further analysed, to understand whether the firm 
engaged in a direct or indirect manner, and in a collaborative or unilateral way (Oetzel and 
Getz 2012; Oetzel, Getz, and Ladek 2007). Firms take a direct approach if they engage 
directly with the parties to the conflict in order to stop it, by facilitating negotiations, or by 
publicly supporting peace for example. They can also approach the conflict indirectly, by 
limiting the consequences of the conflict on people, or by tackling the root causes of the 
conflict.  Firms act collaboratively if they partner with other firms or organizations. If they 
engage by themselves, they adopt a unilateral strategy.  
 
3.2.2 Independent variables: firms’ characteristics 
Factors to take into consideration when analysing Online Service Providers are the 
characteristics exposed in section 2.4.2 of this paper, which literature identifies as possible 
factors explaining firms’ attitude towards conflict. I have focused on these potential factors to 
compare between the different cases, including firm size, ownership structure, level of 
presence in Egypt, location of headquarters, type of service offered, existing CSR policy and 
ethical principles, engagement in wider CSR initiatives, prior experience of conflict and prior 
experience in the country. 
To determine firm size, some use firm annual turnover (Kolk and Lenfant 2012) while 
others use the number of employees (Darendeli and Hill 2015; Oetzel and Getz 2012). For 
this paper, firm size is understood in terms of number of employees, as this allows to build 





Regarding ownership structure, I have looked into whether firms are state owned, 
publicly traded or privately owned, as these are the categories identified by literature 
presented earlier.  
To evaluate the level of a firm’s presence in Egypt, I have looked into whether each 
firm had local offices at the time, and whether their activities were asset-heavy: did the firm 
have offices in Egypt at the time? Did the firm own or manage infrastructure beyond offices? 
(internet and mobile phone providers for example do have infrastructure in the countries 
where they operate).  
Location of headquarters and type of service offered are two factors that speak for 
themselves.  
In order to evaluate OSPs’ creed, understood as a strongly defined ethic line, public 
ethical engagement and Corporate Social Responsibility programmes, I have studied 
corporate sustainability reports issued for the period or just before. I have also searched 
whether each firm participated in voluntary initiatives such as the ones identified in section 
2.1.2. These include the UN Global Compact, the Voluntary Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, and the industry-specific Global Network Initiatives (GNI). References to 
other similar initiatives have also been taken under consideration, as well as mentions of 
strong ethical values.  
Finally, prior experience of conflict and prior experience of conflict in Egypt have 
been evaluated based on academic literature covering such experience, on each firm’s own 
reporting of such experience in their institutional communication, and on media reports. A 
firm is considered has having prior experience of conflict if it mentions such experience in its 
own communication, but I also look into whether firms operated in conflict areas, prior to the 
Arab Spring in Egypt, without mentioning those. Earlier research suggest that firms are 
considered as having prior experience of conflict if one of their wholly owned subsidiaries has 
operated in a conflict area (Oh and Oetzel 2017, 717). However, this definition cannot be 
adopted here, as some OSPs had no presence in Egypt during the Arab Spring, and as others 






3.3 Case selection 
The object of this study is Online Service Providers, and in particular businesses, meaning 
for-profit organisations. This remains a very large universe to select cases from and needs 
narrowing down. As a starting point, I have considered firms and services mentioned in the 
academic literature on the internet in Egypt prior to and during the Arab Spring. This ensures 
that the services provided by these firms were used in Egypt during the Arab Spring, and thus 
that the cases are relevant.  
Work by Howard and Hussain (2013) and Etling et al (2010) map the digital landscape 
in Egypt before the Arab Spring. By mapping how the websites of Egyptian political parties 
link to other websites in November 2010, just before the events of the Arab Spring in Egypt, 
Howard and Hussain highlight the centrality of some OSPs (2013 Figure 3.3 Pre-Uprising 
Structure and Content of Egypt’s Online Political Sphere, November 2010.). As Egyptian 
political parties heavily link to these, they are used intensively in Egypt, and should thus come 
under consideration. In their study of the Arabic political blogosphere, Etling et al (2010, 
1232) show that Egyptian blogs represent a third of the Arabic political blogosphere2. Their 
analysis of how these blogs link to other websites reveals a list of the ten websites that are 
most linked to. Among those, three fall under the category of for-profit online service 
providers, and should thus be included in a list of possible cases.  
Of course, firms mentioned directly in connection with the study of the Arab Spring in 
Egypt should also come under consideration, as proposed above. In her work on human rights 
and the internet during the Egyptian Arab Spring, Cattle (2015) identifies a number of OSPs 
who faced the events in Egypt. Similarly, in their study of social media as tools for activism 
during the Arab Spring, Youmans and York (2012) identify some of the online services used 
by activists. Both Cattle and Youmans and York focus on the challenges for activists of using 
privately run services, from a human rights perspective. Thus, the OSPs they identify are 
relevant when studying their attitude to the Arab Spring in Egypt. Table 2, next page, offers 
an overview of OSPs identified as relevant for the current study, before specific cases have 
been selected.  
  
                                                 
2 The Arabic blogoshpere is defined as blogs, written in Arabic, English or French whose authors have ties to the 





Online Service Provider Source 
Google 
Youmans and York 2012 
Howard and Hussain 2013 
Cattle 2015 
Twitter 
Youmans and York 2012 
Howard and Hussain 2013 
Cattle 2015 
Facebook 
Youmans and York 2012 




Youmans and York 2012 
Howard and Hussain 2013 
Flickr 
Etling 2010 
Youmans and York 2012 
Howard and Hussain 2013 
Yahoo 
Etling 2010 
Youmans and York 2012 
Howard and Hussain 2013 
Blogger 
Etling 2010 
Howard and Hussain 2013 
Wordpress 
Etling 2010 
Howard and Hussain 2013 
Vodafone Group Cattle 2015 
France Telecom – Orange Cattle 2015 
Etisalat Cattle 2015  
Table 1 Online Service Providers identified by academia in the Egyptian context 
The eleven cases identified above are too many for the timeframe available to carry 
out this research, especially as a researcher needs to gain a deep knowledge of each case 
(Ragin 2014, 50). Moreover, in order to be able to qualitatively analyse these OSPs’ attitude 
to the Arab Spring, I needed to be able to access to sufficient data on each company.  
Thus, in order to further narrow down the cases under analysis, I undertook a first 
round of data collection by visiting each firm’s corporate websites or blogs and searching 
these for mentions of each firm in connection with the Arab Spring in Egypt. The goal here 
was to retrieve corporate reports mentioning the events in Egypt, as well as press releases on 
the events or other forms of corporate communication (blog, social media posts etc). I also 
identified whether firms participated in CSR initiatives such as the UN Global Compact or the 
Global Network Initiative3 (GNI). Search engines Google and Duckduckgo were used to 
                                                 
3 The Global Network Initiative is a platform created in 2008 and bringing together ICT companies, human 
rights organizations and academia in order to address the questions of human rights and freedom of expression 





identify whether these firms communicated in the media on the issue. This preliminary 
investigation allowed me to estimate data availability for each of these firms, and to get a first 
idea of their attitude during the Arab Spring and of general characteristics, based on theory 
exposed in section 2. The result of this first round of research is presented in the table below.  
OSP 



















































































































































Based on the table above, some OSPs seem more difficult to analyse than others, as 
little to no data is available on the attitude they adopted during the Arab Spring in Egypt.  
Beyond the question of data availability, case selection should be informed by theory, 
and should aim for replicability (Yin 2013, 57). In the list of possible cases established above, 
two types of firms can be identified: social media on one side, and mobile and internet service 
providers on the other side. Section 2.2 of the present paper highlights a possible limitation of 
bargaining-power – based theory of political risk, which seems unable to explain how firms 
that are not asset-heavy handle political risk. It thus seems necessary to select at least one case 
for each category of firm (social media, and infrastructure).  
Yin underlines that when selecting multiple cases, the research should follow a 
replication logic. Selecting two different social media and two different internet and mobile 
service providers would follow such logic.  
Data availability should not be a criteria to select cases, as this might bias the case 
selection (George and Bennett 2005, 83). However, data availability remains an important 
constraint, and can justify case selection (Yin 2013, 28). Thus, I selected Vodafone Group and 
France Telecom-Orange as two internet and mobile service providers.  
Regarding social media, based on the richness of available data, I chose Twitter on one 
hand, and YouTube on another. However, as YouTube is owned by Google, I decided to 
study the case of Google, while including YouTube’s attitude. Even if YouTube 
communicated separately on the Arab Spring in Egypt, it proved too difficult to study 
YouTube as a separate entity. YouTube does not report separately from Google, as far as 
annual reporting goes, and even though the two companies have head offices located in two 
different areas, further research into office locations, and the functioning of their sales teams 
have shown it is best to study Google, and not YouTube as a separate entity4.  
One limit of selecting cases based on available data, is that negative cases risk being 
excluded. Because negative cases avoided engaging with the Arab Spring in Egypt, there is no 
data available to study their attitude and the factors that might have influenced it. Excluding 
negative cases might skew the study, and exclude the consideration of relevant factors 
(Mahoney and Goertz 2004). Not including the case of Facebook in particular might be 
                                                 
4 Google 2011 Annual report mentions repeatedly YouTube as a ”product” and confirms that a single team is in 





problematic: no data is available from the company, only the testimonials of activists who 
recount how the company reacted to their questions. However, the case of Facebook is highly 
symbolic, as the Arab Spring was named a “Facebook revolution”. The refusal of the firm to 
communicate on the issue is in itself an indication of its attitude. In order to limit bias related 
to excluding a negative case for which some data is available, the case of Facebook has been 
reintegrated in my study for comparison at the discussion stage, where it helps bring more 
light on my research (George and Bennett 2005, 23–24). Another case I have brought into the 
discussion is that of Etisalat, as it is the only non-western firm identified as a potential case, 
and the third mobile operator in the country, after France Telecom-Orange and Vodafone 
Group (Abdulla 2007, 19) 
In sum, the selected cases are: Twitter, Google, Vodafone Group and France Telecom-
Orange. Two cases have been integrated into the discussion, despite the little data that is 
available for each, in order to bring more light to the results. These are Facebook and Etisalat.  
 
3.4 Document analysis 
I have based the study of each case on a variety of documents, including corporate reports 
(both financial and sustainability reports as available), press releases, as well as other 
company communications, including blog posts on their websites and statements made on 
social networks by firms. Other documents included in my research are firms’ presentations at 
conferences and roundtables, interviews and statements released by firms’ executives to the 
press and press releases. If those press releases are not available on firms’ websites, I have 
used quotes of these in the press5.  
The project is limited to the analysis of corporate communication on the events of the 
Arab Spring in Egypt, and testimonies of activists as published in book form or in the press. 
The use of public corporate communication as a source presents a set of limits. These 
                                                 
5 I would have liked to interview resource persons within each company, as this would have allowed me to ask 
targeted questions, and to understand how executives at these companies experienced the events of the Arab 
Spring, and what process was used to decide on the attitude they adopted. Interviews are indeed ideal to get 
targeted data insights (Yin 2013, 110). However, it has proved impossible to complete such interviews within the 
timeframe of the project. Potential resource persons have been identified for some of the cases under 





documents cannot be taken for objective, and the facts they present can include errors 
(Bryman 2012, 451).  
 The next section presents in more details how material was collected. It is followed by 
a section detailing how the collected material was coded and analysed.  
 
3.4.1 Collecting material 
Different methods to collect material were used depending on the type of material. I will 
present first how material related to corporate communication was collected, before 
presenting how media articles quoting each firm were gathered.  
For corporate communication, corporate websites were visited to retrieve the 
necessary material. Because time has passed between the events of the Arab Spring, in 2011, 
and the time of the research (2018), I have faced the issue that a lot of press releases and 
corporate reports that were available on firms’ websites during and just after the Arab Spring 
have now been removed from the visible websites.  
To circumvent the issue, I have used two different strategies. The first one relies on 
using specific queries in search engines, in order to find relevant documents. To avoid bias 
because of the search engine used, two different search engines have been used throughout 
this research: Google, as it is the most popular, and DuckDuckGo. DuckDuckGo is a 
competitor of Google and is interesting in the context of research, as it does not track the user. 
I thus avoid the “filter bubble”, a phenomenon by which search engines present results 
tailored to the user, based on the user’s location and other data embedded in the user’s 
browser (Who Decides What Websites You Visit? 2017).  
The second strategy used to access data as it was available in earlier version of firms’ 
websites is the use of the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine. The Internet Archive has been 
archiving websites since 1996 (Internet Archive: About IA n.d.). By typing a websites’ url in 
the Wayback Machine, on the Internet Archive’s website, one can access the website as it was 
at specified dates. This makes it possible for a researcher to consult a website as it was before 
pages were deleted for example. Note that not all websites are archived, and that some 
websites specifically refuse to be archived.  
Regarding the collection of firms’ quotes in the media, I queried the database Factiva. 





a specific period, in connection to a specific topic. In the case of this paper, Factiva was 
queried for items in English, published between 2011-01-14 and 2011-03-21, mentioning 
Egypt, for each of the four companies under study. A second query was made, over the same 
time period, for press releases mentioning each company.  
 
3.4.2 Coding documents 
Once material was assembled, it was coded in order to see if themes emerged that relate to the 
frameworks of analysis presented in section 3.2. To carry out this task, I used computer 
assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS), which allowed me to import all the 
collected material and code it directly into the software. CAQDAS here was used to manually 
code each document. Although there is the possibility, I did not use automate coding. The 
software is a tool that made it easier to code and review my data, but I did not let it guide the 
process, in order to avoid losing sight of the context of each document (Bryman 2012, 592; 
Yin 2013, 134). The software used is NVivo 11.4.3, chosen because a licence is available 
through the University of Bergen. Using the software also allowed for greater reliability of the 
study, as material, the code used, and memos are all stored in one place.  
Material collected was then organized based on which case it was relevant for, and 
material type – corporate report, communication on corporate blogs and social media, press 
releases as quoted in the media, and quote of company representatives. I then read through the 
material, and coded it, identifying signs of the type of attitude adopted by firms, and firms’ 
characteristics. The code is based on the frameworks defined in section 3.2.1 and figure 2 – 
for firms’ attitude – and section 3.2.2 – regarding firms’ characteristics. These frameworks are 
guiding my analysis of OSPs’ attitude to the events in Egypt (Lewins and Silver 2007, 96). 
While coding material, I observed other themes emerging. This prompted me to add to the 
code. I added code for signs of collaboration between firms maintaining business as usual, 
which the literature review had not suggested. I also coded for firms’ concern with the 
security of their employees and assets, which was a recurring pattern in the material.  
3.4.3 Further analysis 
After coding material for the type of attitude each firm adopted and for firms’ characteristics, 
it appeared that firms’ attitude evolved over time, and that firms adopted a set of strategies, 





based on the dates they communicated on. This timeline is based on the dates on which they 
published blog posts, press releases and other statements and dates at which their 
representatives were quoted. I then confronted this timeline to a timeline of events of the Arab 
Spring in Egypt. By confronting firms’ reaction to the timeline of events in Egypt, I was able 
to identify which attitude firms adopted – avoidant, business as usual, or pro-peace. I also 
identified the set of pro-peace strategies firms chose – words or deeds, direct or indirect, 
collaborative or unilateral. I then summarized the results of this analysis in a table – Table 13, 
page 66. The table offers a comparison of firms’ characteristics, and of their attitude. It made 
it possible to compare between cases and discuss which characteristics seem to best explain 
Online Service Providers’ attitude to the Arab Spring.  
 
3.5 Validity & reliability 
To ensure the quality of a case study, Yin (2013) identifies four criteria: construct validity, 
internal validity, external validity and reliability.  
Regarding the construct validity of the research presented above, to ensure I have 
managed to analyse the reaction of OSPs to the Arab Spring (the dependent variable) and to 
identify relevant independent variables (here the characteristics of OSPs), I have anchored the 
study in the theoretical frameworks presented in section 2.4. Each step - determining how to 
measure the reaction, selecting the OSPs to include in the study, selecting the characteristics 
of OSPs which might explain OSPs’ reaction - is grounded in theory (Yin 2013, 46).  The 
selection of cases and variables has been documented, and I have maintained a chain of 
evidence, as recommended by Yin.  
To ensure the internal validity of the study, I have selected cases with a different 
attitude to the Arab Spring in Egypt: OSPs who took actions to protect their users’ human 
rights and favour peace and OSPs who continued business as usual. I have also reintegrated 
two cases who avoided adopting a specific attitude in my analysis, despite the difficulty of 
obtaining data. This will limit bias linked to selecting on the dependent variable (George and 
Bennett 2005, 83). I have also tried to address rival explanations, and to take into account 
outlier cases (Yin 2013, 47). 
External validity - that the results can be generalised to other OSPs than the one 





try and replicate findings, which will ensure findings can be generalized to other cases (Yin 
2013, 48). Moreover, the case study is informed by theory.  
Regarding reliability, I have documented the case selection process, as well as how 
data was collected. Material on each case is kept in a database, as well as the code and memos 






4 Results & analysis 
In the first section, I focus on the attitude adopted by the four Online Service Providers under 
study. Then, I analyse the characteristics of these OSPs. Finally, I bring the two negative 
cases back into the analysis, so that they can be used to contrast findings at the discussion 
stage.  
4.1 The attitude adopted by OSPs 
In the following section I study how the four Online Service Providers reacted to the events as 
they developed. In Egypt, activists had organized protests against Mubarak’s regime well 
before the events of the Arab Spring, but following the success of protesters in Tunisia, 
marked by Ben Ali’s departure, activists started to coordinate and to organize the first protests 
on 25 January. Selected events are presented in the table below, to facilitate the analysis of 
OSPs’ attitude during the period (Blight, Pulham, and Torpey 2011; Ghonim 2012; Howard 
and Hussain 2013; Miyakawa 2011).  
Date  Events in Egypt 
14/01/2011 Following Ben Ali's departure in Tunisia; Egyptian activists plan coordinated 
protests. 
24/01/2011 First reports that Twitter is inaccessible. 
25/01/2011 First coordinated protests. 
26/01/2011 Twitter & Facebook inaccessible. 
27/01/2011 Twitter, Facebook, YouTube inaccessible. 
28/01/2011 Internet & mobile network shutdown; Day of rage: second mass protest. 
29/01/2011 Mobile phone call service restored. 
02/02/2011 Camel Charge Battle: crack down on protesters in Tarhir Square, Cairo;  
Return of internet service. 
04/02/2011 Day of Departure protests. 
05/02/2011 SMS service restored. 
10/02/2011 Mubarak address - transfers power but does not resign. 
11/02/2011 Mubarak resigns. 
04/03/2011 Appointment of caretaker Prime Minister Essam Sharaf 
21/03/2011 Referendum on constitution amendments 





First, I investigate the attitude adopted by OSPs at the beginning of the Arab Spring. 
Then, I show how firms changed their attitude following the order issued by Egyptian 
authorities to shut down internet and mobile networks. Finally, I look into how firms acted 
beyond the government-ordered shutdown. 
 
4.1.1 At the beginning of the events 
Out of the four companies under analysis, three of them reacted following the first 
coordinated protests organized in Egypt – and the first disruptions. The fourth, France 
Telecom-Orange, did not communicate on the protests, remaining conflict avoidant.  
The first protests were organized on 25 January. As protests began, media already 
reported that some online services, and in particular Twitter, were sporadically blocked in 
Egypt, starting on 24 or 25 January (Miyakawa 2011; Twitter site blocked in Egypt - 
Harvard’s Herdict 2011). This prompted Vodafone Group’s Egyptian subsidiary, Vodafone 
Egypt, to react about the issue on Twitter on 25 January, stating “We didn't block twitter - it's 
a problem all over Egypt and we are waiting for a solution.” (Vodafone Egypt 2011b). The 
Twitter account was usually used by Vodafone Egypt to provide support to customers in the 
country, and to promote its services. Beyond the fact that the firm used the very service that is 
only sporadically accessible to explain that it had nothing to do with it, the firm very early on 
in the events tried to be transparent. At this stage, it does however remain avoidant, not 
connecting the fact that Twitter was not accessible to the ongoing protests. 
Access to Twitter remained blocked for users in Egypt until 27 or 28 January, when 
internet and mobile networks were shut down by the authorities. However, some users 
managed to access Twitter using SMS (Twitter site blocked in Egypt - Harvard’s Herdict 
2011). On 26 January, the official Twitter account for the firm posted about the events in 
Egypt, sharing a list of Twitter accounts established by journalists to follow the events in 
Egypt: “.@MotherJones suggests some smart accounts to follow for news on #Egypt 
including @arabist and @shadihamid. Read on: http://bit.ly/ghxhL2” (Twitter 2011b).  
Highlighting how to use the service to follow on current events was already a common 
practice for Twitter, who highlighted how to follow on New York Fashion Week for example 
(Twitter 2010). Twitter also confirmed to journalists that the Egyptian authorities were 
attempting to block access to the service (Arthur 2011). A way to post on Twitter via SMS, 





Code 2010). Thus, at the beginning of the events in Egypt, Twitter adopted an attitude of 
business as usual, mentioning the events, but not promoting peace. 
Google adopted a similar attitude, communicating on the events in Egypt by relaying 
footage of the protests uploaded by users on its service, YouTube. This was done in two ways, 
via YouTube’s Twitter handle (@YouTube) and via the official blog YouTube Trends. On 
Twitter, @YouTube shared links to two videos, accompanied with the comment “View raw 
footage of the protests in Egypt” (YouTube 2011d) on 26 January. On the same day, a post on 
the blog YouTube Trends shared a playlist of videos from the protests. The playlist was made 
of “some of the most popular clips as well as those curated by New York Times’ Lede and 
Storyful” (Protests in Egypt Captured in Dramatic, On-the-Scene Videos 2011). In both these 
communications, YouTube showed off how its service is used to share information. It acted to 
relay information, and publicize its service, but did not take action. This behaviour can be 
considered as “business as usual”, as YouTube routinely highlighted popular videos via 
Twitter and its blog YouTube Trends on varied topics such as music, or comic home videos. 
YouTube did not take position in favour of human rights and positive peace in these 
messages: text accompanying links to videos of the protests is descriptive, quoting media 
outlet and adopting a similar tone rather than announcing an engagement for peace and human 
rights.  
Note that both Twitter and Google adopted a similar strategy of showcasing how to 
use their services to follow events, regardless of their type. Another interesting aspect is that 
both actually linked to lists of accounts or videos to follow established by journalists; they did 
not curate these themselves.  
 
4.1.2 Internet and mobile network shutdown 
On Friday, 28 January 2011, internet and mobile phone services were shut down, following an 
order from the authorities. Service was shut down in the morning just before a second mass 
protest took place. Today, some consider that the blackout order was the “tipping point”, 






4.1.2.1 Maintaining transparency 
To completely shut down internet and mobile services, the authorities ordered operators, 
including Vodafone Group, France Telecom-Orange and Etisalat, to stop providing the 
service to their customers. The blackout was not done by state services: the firms providing 
access to the service were the ones who acted. 
Following the order, Vodafone Group published a press release on its website on 28 
January. This press release, published on the group’s website, was presented as signed by 
Vodafone Egypt (Mobile operators in Egypt given suspension orders - Vodafone 2011). It 
stated, “All mobile operators in Egypt have been instructed to suspend services in selected 
areas. Under Egyptian legislation the authorities have the right to issue such an order and we 
are obliged to comply with it. The Egyptian authorities will be clarifying the situation in due 
course.” On the same day, the group’s CEO, Vittorio Colao, spoke on the issue at the World 
Economic Forum in Davos, along the lines of the press release issued on the group’s website, 
and expressing hope that the government would reverse the decision (Rhoads and Fowler 
2011). Like its competitor Vodafone Group, France Telecom-Orange shut down internet and 
mobile phone services, and released a statement confirming “measures to block mobile phone 
service” had been taken by the Egyptian authorities (El Gazzar, Vitorovich, and Bender 2011; 
Rhoads and Fowler 2011).  
So, on this first day of service disruption, both Vodafone Group and France Telecom-
Orange explained the orders they were given via press release and complied with those. They 
did not elaborate on why they chose to comply with government demands. Communication 
was made via each multinational, not through their local subsidiaries.  
After the week end, on 31 January, Vodafone Group announced via press release that 
cell phone service had been restored on 29 January, and that the group did not have any 
option but to comply with the authorities’ orders, both from a legal and technical perspective 
(Kirk 2011; Vitorovich and Bender 2011). The government could have shut down the network 
without the group’s help, but this would have damaged infrastructure and made it difficult for 
the firm the restore service. The group also highlighted that its priority was the safety of 
employees. Only voice capabilities were restored: mobile internet and SMS were still shut 
down (Parker 2011). A France Telecom-Orange spokesperson was quoted, on the same day, 





that 20 expatriate employees and their families were repatriated from Egypt the day before 
(France Telecom Repatriates Its Egypt-Based Expatriates 2011; Kirk 2011).  
Both firms explained their decision to comply with orders given by the authorities by 
their concern for the security of their employees (France Telecom - Orange 2012b, 57–58; 
Kirk 2011). Vodafone Group also highlighted the fact that Egyptian authorities could have 
disregarded a decision to not shut down service by damaging the firm’s infrastructure, with 
long term consequences for its future operations. Both firms spoke from a perspective of risk 
management: they did not seem to consider peace or human rights aspects in their decisions, 
rather focusing on the immediate concern of the security of their employees and assets.  
A few days later, on 3 February, Vodafone Group explained that SMS service was still 
shut down, and that the Egyptian government had requested it sent regime-scripted SMS to all 
their customers. The statement explained: “Vodafone Group has protested to the authorities 
that the current situation regarding these messages is unacceptable. We have made clear that 
all messages should be transparent and clearly attributable to the originator." (Egypt forced 
firms to send pro-regime SMS 2011; Parker 2011; Sonne and Colchester 2011). The group’s 
CEO Vittorio Colao was again quoted in the media, stating that mobile internet services had 
been restored a day earlier (Holton and Fayed 2011), and confirming that the group is “in a 
continuous dialogue with government” (Parker 2011).  Some sources also reported that the 
UK government complained to the Egyptian ambassador in London on the same issue, on the 
same day, “after a request by Vodafone” (Parker and Thompson 2011). Two Vodafone Group 
managers were injured during protests in Egypt on the same day, and one of them was 
missing (Parker 2011). 3rd February marks the last time statements were issued by the group 
during the period under study.  
In releasing statements complaining about actions the firm had to take following 
orders by the Egyptian authorities, Vodafone Group continues to adopt a business as usual 
strategy. It communicates on the events in Egypt, but still does not express itself in favour of 
peace, nor does it take action to address the conflict. 
In a similar move, and on the same day, France Telecom-Orange issued a statement 
criticizing the fact that it had been required by the authorities to send pro-government SMS to 
customers. In this statement, the firm mentioned that it “strongly disapproves of any message 
of a political nature that runs against the neutrality principle which defines our role as a 





“national security and general safety” (Sonne and Colchester 2011). France Telecom-
Orange’s CEO also expressed himself on the firm’s concern for its employees’ safety, saying 
that "when armed police arrive at your offices there is not much one can do” (Sonne and 
Colchester 2011). On 5 February, Mobinil’s CEO Hassan Kabbani announced that SMS 
services had been restored (El Gazzar 2011).   
Both Vodafone Group and France Telecom – Orange used press releases and press 
conferences to explain the situation in Egypt, and to justify why they chose to follow the 
government’s order to shut down services. They expressed themselves in terms that 
highlighted the risks taken by their employees, and the risks to infrastructure they managed, 
but did not mention concerns over peace and human rights issues. Thus, both firms adopted a 
strategy of business as usual, acknowledging the events and explaining their decision, but not 
defending human rights or trying to support peace.  
Both firms communicated on the same days, on the same issues, and giving similar 
explanations. This can be explained by the fact that each of them reacted to the same events, 
but could also indicate a form of cooperation between the two, or maybe one firm followed 
closely on the other? To answer this question, I would need to supplement material already 
gathered with interviews of decision-makers within each firm, something I was not able to do. 
 
Firm Attitude 
Vodafone Group Business as usual 
France Telecom-Orange Business as usual 
Table 4 Vodafone Group and France Telcom-Orange's attitude to the events 
 
4.1.2.2 Expressing support for human rights 
Other firms reacted to the internet and mobile network shutdown by criticizing the Egyptian 
authorities’ decision, and by expressing their attachment to human rights.  
On 28 January, just as internet and mobile network were shut down, one of Twitter’s 
cofounders and the firm’s general counsel published a blog post titled “The Tweets must 
flow”, describing the firm’s engagement for freedom of expression, and how the firm protects 





was not mentioned clearly, references made in the text do point to these events: the text 
mentions tweets that “may facilitate positive change in a repressed country”, and affirms that, 
“our position on freedom of expression carries with it a mandate to protect our users' right to 
speak freely and preserve their ability to contest having their private information revealed”. 
Given the context in which the blog post is published, it seems that the blog post can be read 
as referring to the events in Egypt, among others. One of the authors of the post, Biz Stone, 
was interviewed a couple of weeks later, as events in Egypt were still on-going, about 
Twitter’s reaction to the shutdown. He explained how shocking it was, for the firm, to see that 
the authorities went beyond blocking its service, and how what was important for them was to 
enable users to communicate, regardless of opinion expressed (Gross 2011).  
Thus, the blog post published just after the internet shutdown is a form of engagement 
for peace, in the context of the Arab Spring in Egypt. The firm here engages for peace, in 
words, indirectly and unilaterally, as it neither engages with the parties to the conflict, nor 
specifically mentions Egypt.  
 
Firm Attitude 
Vodafone Group Business as usual 
France Telecom-Orange Business as usual 
Twitter Pro-peace, in words, indirectly & unilaterally 
Table 5 Vodafone Group, France Telecom-Orange and Twitter's attitude 
 
4.1.2.3 Taking action to support people in Egypt 
On 31 January, a post on Google’s official blog announced that the firm, together with 
Twitter, took specific action to “help people in Egypt stay connected at this very difficult 
time” (Singh and Mardini 2011). The post was also shared on Twitter (Google 2011b).  
Some Google engineers worked together with engineers at Twitter and SayNow to 
create a service for users to call a phone number, where they can tell their message, which is 
then posted on Twitter with the hashtag #egypt. The service, named Speak-to-Tweet, allowed 
users to share information on Twitter despite the shutdown of internet. Users could also listen 





Google engineer, AbdelKarim Mardini, and by Ujjwal Singh, the co-founder of SayNow, in 
collaboration with Twitter. SayNow had been bought by Google a week earlier. Twitter also 
announced the creation of the Speak-to-Tweet service in collaboration with Google via a 
tweet (Nonprofits 2011; Twitter 2011a). It was already possible for users to publish messages 
on the service using SMS, but the collaboration with Google made it possible for them to 
bypass the shutdown of mobile networks, as users could call a dedicated service from a 
landline to post messages.  
By creating this service, Google & Twitter collaborated to provide people in Egypt 
with a solution to by-pass the government’s shutdown of internet and mobile network. It is a 
form of indirect engagement for peace, as the firms did not address parties to the conflict, but 
rather limited the consequences of the conflict on affected populations. Creating this service 
was also an occasion for Google to communicate on its new acquisition and to demonstrate its 
capabilities.  
Google took other actions in favour of peace, but independently. The firm updated its 
Transparency reporting: “Given the recent interest in the availability of our services, we've 
reduced the time delay in the Traffic tool on our Transparency Report to less than four hours” 
(Google updates service tracker amid Egypt shutdown 2011). The Traffic tool allows users to 
visualize traffic to Google’s services by country of origins, over a period of time, and thus 
shows service disruption during the blackout in Egypt. Prior to the update announced by 
Google on 29 January, there was a delay of 30 hour. In this announcement, the firm also 
stated: “We believe that access is a fundamental right, and it's very sad if it's denied to citizens 
of Egypt or any country”. The firm publicly criticized the Egyptian authorities’ decision to 
limit its citizens’ human rights, and thus engaged directly in favour of peace. This is a form of 
engagement in words, because the action taken – updating its transparency report -  does not 
affect people in Egypt. 
Google’s video-sharing service, YouTube, also took steps with regards to the events in 
Egypt (Ma 2011). In a blog post, YouTube announced three different ways the service helped 
“people access and share” videos of the events: YouTube’s CitizenTube channel highlighted 
the latest footage, banners on the site pointed users towards videos of the protests, and 
YouTube streamed Al Jazeera live broadcast of the events, both in Arabic and English. The 
blog post also mentioned the Speak-to-Tweet service put together by Google. Here, YouTube 
collaborated with another organization, Al Jazeera, in order to be able to share more videos of 





The fact that YouTube pushed the new service developed by parent company Google 
confirms that the two cannot be considered separately from one another in the context of this 
paper.   
Finally, Google also set up a page on its Crisis Response website, putting together 
resources on the events in Egypt, linking to relevant YouTube channels, its Speak-to-Tweet 
tool, and other services not provided by Google, such as a way to connect to the internet from 
a landline or to access blocked websites. That page also provided emergency phone numbers 
in Egypt, and the contacts of embassies and NGOs (Egyptian Resources 2011a). Google 
updated the page over time, as a comparison with a later version of the page demonstrates 
(Egyptian Resources 2011b)6.  
Thus, Google took further action by developing new ways to share information, follow 
on the events and support people affected through its Transparency report, its video-sharing 
service YouTube and its crisis response page. All of these demonstrate the firm’s engagement 
for peace, in words, directly and in deeds, indirectly and collaboratively.  
 
Firm Attitude 
Vodafone Group Business as usual 
France Telecom-Orange Business as usual 
Google Pro-peace, in deeds, indirectly, collaboratively; 
Pro-peace, in words, directly, unilaterally 
Twitter Pro-peace, in words, indirectly, unilaterally; 
Pro-peace, in deeds, indirectly, collaboratively 
Table 6 Vodafone Group. France Telecom-Orange, Google and Twitter's attitude 
 
                                                 
6 Versions of the pages as available on 1 February 2011 and 21 March 2011 can be found through Internet 





4.1.3 Beyond the service shutdown 
Mobile and internet networks were restored over several days: phone calls service was 
restored on 29 January, internet on 2 February and SMS on 5 February. Protests did however 
continue, and firms continued to react to the events, not just to the network shutdown. 
Google’s YouTube continued to regularly use its Twitter account and YouTube 
Trends blog to serve as megaphone for videos of the events in Egypt (YouTube 2011c). 
Beyond sharing links to relevant live broadcast and popular videos, YouTube published two 
blog posts analysing how its service was used in the context of the events in Egypt. One 
compared searches on its service during the events in Egypt to searches at the time of the 
2009 protests in Iran (YouTube 2011a), and the other analysed the keywords used across 
countries that experienced an Arab Spring (YouTube 2011b). Thus, Google continued to 
show how its service can be used not only to follow with political events but also to analyse 
them. These posts point towards the fact that the events in Egypt were also an opportunity for 
Google to showcase the advantages of its product. 
Twitter maintained its commitment to freedom of expression. On 11 February, the 
firm announced the expansion of its pre-existing initiative awarding free promoting space to a 
non-profit each month. The programme was expanded by offering such space to “non-profit 
organizations that are particularly relevant during a crisis” (Diaz-Ortiz 2011), and the selected 
organization on 11 February was the Committee to Protect Journalists, because Twitter 
“believes that the freedom of expression is an essential human right”. Twitter continued to 
have the same attitude towards the conflict: the firm still engaged in favour of peace and 
human rights. It did not take action, instead using words and supporting relevant non-profit 
organizations. 
Mobile and internet service providers Vodafone Egypt and Mobinil, the Egyptian 
subsidiaries of Vodafone Group and France Telecom-Orange, announced compensations for 
their customers, once service was restored. The compensation plan was agreed upon between 
the three mobile operators, Vodafone Egypt, Mobinil and Etisalat (Orange Egypt 2011a; 
Vodafone Egypt 2011a). France Telecom-Orange’s subsidiary Mobinil also announced 
extraordinary measures on Twitter. In order to ensure all customers could communicate in 
case of emergency, the firm started offering free calling time and delay in bill payment on 6 
February (Orange Egypt 2011c, 2011b, 2011d). These measures are commercial 





shutdown, not measures implemented to protect their human rights, as neither Vodafone 
Egypt or Mobinil mention them in their announcement. The fact that they collaborated on 
compensations does raise the question of possible cooperation between Vodafone Group and 
France Telecom-Orange to maintain business as usual during the conflict.  
Both Vodafone Group and France Telecom-Orange mention the events of the Arab 
Spring in their sustainability reports, as well as the steps taken. Vodafone Group’s 
Sustainability Report covers the year ending on 31 March 2011 and was written soon after the 
period under study. In the report, the group’s CEO explains that he believes the firm adopted 
the right approach towards the events (Vodafone Group 2011, 2). The report highlights that 
the group faced questions regarding its role in protecting human rights and freedom of 
expression (Vodafone Group 2011, 9). The report mentions that Vodafone Group engaged 
with NGOs and industry initiatives such as The Global Network Initiative in order to “explain 
(their) decisions”. France Telecom-Orange too refers to the events in Egypt in its 
sustainability report (France Telecom - Orange 2012b, 57–58). It mentions the United Nations 
directing principles for business and human rights 7 , and that France Telecom-Orange 
participated in an “industry dialogue” during the Summer 2011. Thus, both firms mention an 
on-going reflection on their attitude in Egypt in January-March 2011, while still commenting 
they believe they adopted the right one.  
 
4.1.4 Summary 
Analysing Online Service Providers’ communication during and immediately after the events 
of the Arab Spring in Egypt offers an overview of the attitude each of them adopted. Based on 
this material, I observe that firms’ attitude evolved as the events progressed, as well as their 
modalities. The order to shut down internet and mobile phone services issued by the Egyptian 
authorities on 28 January seems to mark a shift in the attitude adopted by three of the four 
firms. Vodafone Group, almost since the beginning of the period under study, maintained 
business as usual, explaining what happened in Egypt and what the firm did. France Telecom-
Orange adopted a position similar to that of Vodafone Group following the blackout.  
                                                 





Twitter and Google both maintained business as usual before the internet and mobile 
service shutdown, communicating on how to use their services to follow with the events in 
Egypt. After networks were shut down, each firm engaged in favour of peace in several ways. 
Twitter engaged in favour of peace in words, but in a non-specific manner, and later 
collaborated with Google in implementing a system to help Egyptians by-pass the blockade. 




Vodafone Group Business as usual 
France Telecom-Orange Business as usual 
Google Pro-peace, in deeds, indirectly, collaboratively; 
Pro-peace, in words, directly, unilaterally 
Twitter Pro-peace, in words, indirectly, unilaterally; 
Pro-peace, in deeds, indirectly, collaboratively 
Table 7 OSPs' attitude to the Arab Spring in Egypt 
 
4.2 Characteristics of OSPs 
In order to study the independent variables identified earlier - characteristics that could help 
explain OSPs’ attitude – I first look into firm size, ownership structure and type of service 
offered. I then focus on whether each firm had employees or assets in Egypt, the location of 
their headquarters, whether they had previous experience of conflict, and whether they had 
prior ethical principle and corporate social responsibility policies.  
 
4.2.1 Size, ownership structure and type of service offered 
The four firms differ greatly in terms of number of employees. Vodafone Group had 83,900 
employees worldwide at the time of the Arab Spring in Egypt (Vodafone Annual Report 
2011, sec. People). France Telecom-Orange had 172,000 employees in 2011 (France Telecom 
- Orange 2012a, 4). As of September 2010 Twitter had 300 employees (About Twitter 2011). 





in February 2010 and 30 employees in the Summer of 2009 (MacGillivray 2010). Google had 
32,467 employees as of 2011 (Google 2012). 
Three of the four firms were publicly traded: Vodafone Group, France Telecom – 
Orange and Google, whilst Twitter was privately owned. It explains why Twitter does not 
have an Annual Report available for the year 2011. The French state, at the time, owned 
twenty-seven percent of France Telecom-Orange’s capital (France Telecom - Orange 2012a, 
107). Both France Telecom-Orange and Vodafone Group operated joint ventures in Egypt: 
Vodafone Group owns about fifty-five percent of Vodafone Egypt (Vodafone Egypt 
Sustainability Report 2010 - 2013 2013), the rest was owned by Telecom Egypt, itself owned 
in majority by the Egyptian government (Abdulla 2007, 18); France Telecom-Orange owned 
and operated Egyptian subsidiary Mobinil as a joint venture with Egyptian firm Orascom 
(Mobinil 2012).  
Two firms provide mobile phone service and internet access, Vodafone Group and 
France Telecom-Orange. Google defines itself as “a global technology leader” whose mission 
is “to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful” 
(Google 2012). Google’s products include a search engine, video-sharing site YouTube and a 
series of other online applications (such as email). The firm’s primary revenue source is 
advertising. As for Twitter, it describes itself as “real-time information network that connects 




Ownership structure Type of service 





state owns 27% 
Mobile & internet access 
Google 
32,467 Publicly-traded 
Social media & internet 
services 
Twitter 300 Privately-held Social media 






4.2.2 In-country presence  
Three of the four firms under study were present in Egypt during the Arab Spring: they had 
offices, and two of them also had communication infrastructure in the country. Based on 
Vodafone Egypt’s reporting, there were 4,199 employees in Egypt in March 2010 (Vodafone 
Egypt Sustainability Report 2010 - 2013 2013). France Telecom-Orange’s Mobinil had 4,689 
employees in Egypt in 2011 (Mobinil 2012, 27). Google, according to employee testimonies, 
had offices in Cairo at the time (Ghonim 2012). Little data is available regarding the location 
of Twitter’s offices at the time, but the firm announced the opening of its first offices in the 
Middle East and North Africa in 2015, confirming it did not have offices in Egypt in 2011 
(MENA 2015). 
  
Firm Presence in Egypt 
Vodafone Group Yes: offices & infrastructure 
France Telecom-Orange Yes: offices & infrastructure 
Google Yes: offices 
Twitter No 
Table 9 OSPs' in-country presence 
 
4.2.2.1 Employee security 
The fact that Vodafone Group, France Telecom-Orange and Google had assets in Egypt 
means that the events in the country could have an impact on the security of their employees 
and infrastructure. Both Vodafone Group and France Telecom-Orange regularly mentioned 
their concern over security in their communication during the events and in their annual and 
sustainability reporting. Google did not mention such concerns. 
Concerns over the safety of employees and infrastructure was among the explanations 
Vodafone Group gave for its decision to comply with the Egyptian authorities’ order to shut 
down service, and to send scripted messages to customers (Kirk 2011; Parker 2011). It was 
also reported that two Vodafone managers were injured during protests in Egypt on 3 
February, and that one of them was missing, confirming the firm’s concern (Parker 2011). 





working. The firm’s CSR report explains how the group reacted to the events, focussing on 
the safety of employees in the country, and on keeping their ability to control their 
infrastructure. (Vodafone Group 2011, 9). In its Annual Report too, the firm mentions the 
events in Egypt, stating that their “employees risked their personal safety in a very volatile 
environment to keep the network up and running at a time when mobile communication was 
more important than ever, keeping the voice network outage to less than 24 hours” (Vodafone 
Annual Report 2011, sec. Chairman’s statement). 
Concern over employee safety seems to have influenced France Telecom-Orange’s 
attitude. The firm repatriated twenty expatriate employees and their families from Egypt on 
30 January 2011 (France Telecom Repatriates Its Egypt-Based Expatriates 2011; Kirk 2011).  
France Telecom-Orange’s CEO also expressed himself during a press conference saying that 
"when armed police arrive at your offices there is not much one can do” (Sonne and 
Colchester 2011). That concern was confirmed later in the firm’s sustainability report, which 
highlights employee safety and the need to ensure business continuity to explain their 
decisions (France Telecom - Orange 2012b, 24). 
 
4.2.2.2 When company executives demonstrate 
Firms present in Egypt also faced the fact that some of their employees, executives and board 
members chose to protest, as was the case for the two Vodafone Group managers who were 
injured (Parker 2011).  
Khaled Bichara, the CEO of Orascom, France Telecom-Orange’s partner in Egyptian 
joint venture Mobinil, was filmed demonstrating against the regime in Cairo. He was also 
quoted as saying that he was “there on a personal capacity”. Mobinil board member and 
founder of Orascom, Naguib Sawiris, engaged in politics too, calling for the formations of a 
unity government (Holton 2011). Mobinil board member Naguib Sawiris said he negotiated 
with the government for the release of Google employee Wael Ghonim (Google executive 
released in Egypt & joins protest 2011). Even though these were not directly linked to France 
Telecom-Orange, the fact that close partners engaged themselves in the conflict was likely 
worrying for the group.  
Google learnt of the disappearance of their Head of Marketing for MENA on 30 
January 2011. Based on Wael Ghonim’s testimony, which he published in the form of a book 





he worked, on a holiday to participate. Google, without knowing of his involvement in the 
protest, attempted to locate him (Ghonim 2012, 237). The timeline is not precise, but the firm 
decided to follow a dual strategy: display ads on their services, targeted at users in Egypt, 
asking for anyone with information to call a dedicated phone number and hiring security firms 
in Cairo to look for him at police station and hospitals. Calls for information on Ghonim’s 
location were also released through the media (Google says Middle Eastern marketing 
manager has been missing since last being seen in Egypt 2011). It is unclear whether Google 
attempted to dialogue with the Egyptian authorities to facilitate the release of its employee. 
Ghonim himself says his release was negotiated by his activist friends during meetings with 
the authorities (Ghonim 2012, 241).  
Google did not mention the disappearance of Wael Ghonim on its official blog or 
Twitter handle until after his release on 6 February (Google 2011a). The firm later stated 
“We’re incredibly proud of you, @Ghonim, & of course will welcome you back when you’re 
ready” (Google 2011c). Google highlights that he does not work for the firm at the moment, 
and that Ghonim’s opinions are not Google’s. The company’s CEO reaffirmed the same 
position on 15 February (Svensson 2011).  
In his testimony, Ghonim mentions the role of an Egyptian colleague who updated his 
friends in Egypt on a daily basis. That colleague is AbdelKarim Mardini, one of the two 
authors of Google’s blog post announcing the Speak-to-Tweet service on 31 January 2011, a 
day after Google learns of his disappearance (Ghonim 2012, 237). It is difficult to tell whether 
the steps taken by Google in favour of peace after learning of their employee’s disappearance 
are directly linked. However, the fact that the same employee worked on the Speak-to-Tweet 
service and kept friends of Ghonim in Egypt informed seems to indicate that the fact that 
Google had Egyptian employees in Egypt and elsewhere played a role in the firm’s 
engagement for peace during the conflict.  
In sum, firms that had infrastructure in the country were exposed to pressures from the 
Egyptian government, which was not the case of Google, who had only offices in the country. 
The three firms faced challenges related to their employees’ engagement in the conflict, while 
attempting to maintain a neutral position themselves. The case of Google also seems to 
indicate that the engagement of Egyptian managers in favour of peace at least contributed to 






4.2.3 Location of headquarters 
Two of the four firms are headquartered in Europe and are part of joint ventures in Egypt. 
Vodafone Group is headquartered in the United Kingdom (Vodafone Annual Report 2011). 
France Telecom-Orange (now called Orange) is headquartered in France (France Telecom - 
Orange 2012b). It owns and operates Egyptian subsidiary Mobinil as a joint venture with 
Egyptian firm Orascom, which offers mobile and internet services in Egypt (Mobinil 2012). 
The two other firms, Google and Twitter, are headquartered in California, USA (About 
Twitter 2011; Google 2012).  
From the gathered data, it is difficult to assess whether the location of firms’ 
headquarters played a role in their attitude to the events. The role played by the firms’ home 
government appears somewhat clearer when looking into some of the firms’ past experience 
of conflict, both in Egypt and in other countries, in particular with regards to the role of the 
American government. Both Twitter and Google experienced pressure from their home 
government to act in favour of peace before the events of the Arab Spring, as I will show in 
section 5.2.4. It is likely that if they did not experience pressure from their government 
concerning the events in Egypt, past experience of pressure during similar events played a 
role in the attitude they adopted in Egypt.  
A single source mentions that Vodafone Group asked for the British government to 
talk with the Egyptian authorities about the service disruption and scripted messages orders 
(Parker and Thompson 2011). It is difficult to base conclusions from a single mention in the 
media, but it would be an interesting question to raise in an interview with managers at 
Vodafone Group.  
The four firms are headquartered in western, democratic countries, where they also 
have users and clients. The events in Egypt were very much covered in western media, as 
shown by the number of articles I have looked into while gathering material for this study. It 
thus seems reasonable to consider that all these firms faced at least some pressure from 






Firm Headquarters location 
Vodafone Group United Kingdom 
France Telecom-Orange France 
Google USA 
Twitter USA 
Table 10 Location of OSPs' headquarters 
 
4.2.4 The question of prior experience 
In order to understand whether each firm had prior experience of operating during conflict, I 
look into whether each firm mentions operating during conflict prior to the Arab Spring, In 
particular, I look into whether they refer to prior experience of conflict, and of conflict in 
Egypt, both when discussing the conflict under study and in earlier communication.  
  
4.2.4.1 Of conflict 
Earlier reports released by Vodafone Group do not mention prior experience of conflict, nor 
do reports covering the period under study. However, Vodafone Group owns Safaricom, an 
internet and mobile network service provider in Kenya, as a joint venture (Vodafone Annual 
Report 2011, sec. At a glance). Safaricom experienced issues related to the use of its service 
during post-electoral violence following the 2007 presidential elections in Kenya, when mass 
SMS were used to share hatred and call for violence between tribes. Safaricom was already a 
joint venture of Vodafone at the time. During the conflict in Kenya, the CEO of Safaricom 
was approached by the government about shutting down SMS service, but instead suggested 
that service providers send mass SMS to their customers promoting peace – which Safaricom 
did (Goldstein and Rotich 2008, 5). Safaricom’s initiatives in Kenya are covered by Vodafone 
Group’s Sustainability Report, but the 2007-2008 crisis is not mentioned in that year’s report. 
In fact, there is no company communication on prior experience of conflict. This seems to 
show that the Vodafone Group had not internalized that experience.  
France Telecom-Orange does refer to prior experience of conflict in the CSR report, in 
a box focusing on “ensuring employees safety in countries in crisis” (France Telecom - 





taken in Madagascar in 2009, but does not detail further. However, France Telecom’s reports 
for 2009 do not mention the Madagascar crisis or any steps taken in that crisis. The 
Madagascar crisis involved demonstrations leading to a coup d’état, but online service 
providers were not involved in a way similar to the Arab Spring (International Crisis Group 
2010).  
Other conflicts which France Telecom-Orange might have had experience with 
include the April 2009 revolution in Moldova and the post-election crisis in Kenya in 2007-
2008. During parliamentary elections in Moldova in April 2009, opposition activists used 
SMS and social media to first campaign and then protest the election of a communist majority 
in parliament. Following the publication of election results, on 7 April, protesters gathered in 
the capital’s city centre, where protests turned violent. During the revolution, the government 
shutdown internet in the country, and cut mobile networks in the capital’s city centre. 
However, these service cuts were managed by the authorities themselves, who shut down the 
only internet access point in the country (of which all service providers are dependent), and 
organized the mobile phone network shutdown in a limited area, the capital’s city centre 
(Lysenko and Desouza 2012). Thus, service providers like France Telecom-Orange were not 
involved in the protests, nor were they questioned in media coverage. France Telecom-Orange 
only entered the Kenyan market by buying national firm Telkom in December 2007, and 
mobile services were first launched in October 2008, after the crisis (France Telecom 2009).  
France Telecom-Orange experienced conflict before, in Madagascar, and capitalized 
on that experience, according to its report. The conflict in Madagascar is different from the 
one in Egypt, as there was no service shutdown in Madagascar.  France Telecom-Orange does 
not refer to other conflicts it experienced that were similar to the Arab Spring in Egypt (where 
firms were involved in the events by the authorities).  
Twitter had also gathered experience of facing conflict prior to the Arab Spring, even 
as it had no in-country presence there. In Iran in 2009, protesters used the service to 
demonstrate against the elections’ results. At the time, Twitter decided to delay an update to 
its service so that any potential downtime would occur during night-time in Iran (Gross 2011; 
Stone 2009a, 2009b). Twitter, at the time, was asked by the US State Department to delay 
their update (Morozov 2012, 9–14), which Twitter co-founder himself admits. He quickly 
adds that others had made the same request, and that the firm made its decision independently 





had already experienced its service being used by activists during similar events, and pressure 
from the US government in that context.  
Google had also acquired some experience during the 2009 protests in Iran. The blog 
post published on the YouTube Trends blog shows that the firm is aware of this, as it 
compares searches on YouTube at the time of the protests in Iran and during the events in 
Egypt (Comparing Searches for “Iran” in 2009 with “Egypt” in 2011 2011). In this post, 
YouTube shows how there were more searches for Iran at the time than there are for Egypt in 
2011 on its platform, but that when looking at searches on the search engine Google, it is the 
opposite. This shows that YouTube and Google’s attitude to the events in Egypt is informed 
by previous experience of the Iranian conflict. In fact, YouTube’s post on its official blog 
describing what the service is doing for the protest in Egypt mentions that they have “used 
similar tools and live streaming technologies in the past to give our users access to 
information on major world news events, such as the Haiti earthquake and the protests in 
Iran” (Ma 2011).  
Three of the four online service providers under study mention prior experience with 
operating in the context of a conflict: France Telecom-Orange in Madagascar, and Google and 
Twitter in Iran. Neither Twitter nor Google were present locally in Iran during the conflict. 
Two of the three firms, Google and Twitter, had adopted a pro-peace attitude in an earlier 
conflict – in Iran in 2009.  
 
4.2.4.2 In Egypt 
Vodafone Group had experience from operating in Egypt at the time of the Arab Spring, and 
it was also tightly connected to the Egyptian authorities through its partner Telecom Egypt. 
Vodafone Group’s activities in Egypt started in 1998. Telecom Egypt is controlled by the 
state (Sonne and Colchester 2011). Similarly, France Telecom-Orange has been present in 
Egypt since the creation of Mobinil in 1998, so the firm had experience of operating in the 
country. However, neither firm mention prior experience of facing conflict or human rights 
issues in Egypt. They seem to not have had prior experience of conflict in Egypt.  
Google had prior experience of facing issues regarding how Egyptian activists and 
bloggers used their services, and with how its home government, the USA, considers the 
firm’s role in that context. The State Department contacted Google in 2007 and again in 2008 





exposed police violence, and were taken down by YouTube (Requesting Department 
Assistance to Restore Egyptian Blogger’s Youtube Access 2008; Tsotsis 2011).  
Twitter had also experienced being used in political demonstrations in Egypt, as 
recounted by cofounder Biz Stone on several occasions. Twitter was aware of its service 
being used by activists in Egypt, as shown by the blog post the firm published at the time 
(Stone 2008b). An American student in Cairo, Egypt, was arrested by the authorities in 2008 
during a protest and was freed after having posted about his arrest on Twitter. The American 
student had started using Twitter after Egyptian activists had shown him the service (Gross 
2011; Stone 2008a, 2009a).  
Thus, it seems that three of the four firms had experienced conflict before, as they 
themselves mention such events in their reporting and public communication. Two firms had 
experienced conflict, or at least human rights-related challenges, in Egypt prior to 2011.  
 
Firm 
Prior experience of 
conflict 
Prior experience of conflict in 
Egypt 
Vodafone Group No No 
France Telecom-Orange Yes No 
Google Yes Yes 
Twitter Yes Yes 
Table 11 OSPs' prior experience of conflict 
 
4.2.5 Creed: corporate social responsibility and ethics 
To evaluate whether each firm had creed before the events, I study the firms’ corporate social 
responsibility policies, whether they were part of industry initiatives and whether they had 
established ethical principles.  
Vodafone Group had an established practice of publishing a Sustainability Report 
yearly but was not a member of industry initiatives such as the Global Compact or the Global 
Network Initiative (GNI). However, the firm mentioned engaging with the Global Network 
Initiative while developing a policy concerning its customers’ freedom of expression and right 





attitude during the events in Egypt. The report does acknowledge the firm’s responsibility to 
respect customers’ human rights (Vodafone Group 2011, 9–10), and that new policies have 
been put in place in that regards.  
France Telecom-Orange also has an established practice of publishing a sustainability 
report yearly, and has been a member of the UN Global Compact since 2000 (France 
Telecom-Orange 2011, 9). Its 2010 CSR report, covering the year just before the Arab Spring, 
also refers to the OECD principles for multinational corporations, and to a code of ethics. 
However, no direct reference is made to freedom of expression, or to the right to privacy of its 
customers in that report, even as references are made to other human rights such as the 
freedom of assembly (France Telecom-Orange 2011, 45).  The report for the year 2011, which 
explains the steps taken after the events in Egypt (France Telecom - Orange 2012b, 6, 57–58) 
shows more awareness towards these questions. It mentions the new UN Principles for 
Business and Human Rights, adopted in June 2011, and explains the firm is engaged with 
stakeholders in a dialogue to define how these should be implemented.  
Google has had a strong motto since it became public, “Don’t be evil” (Page and Brin 
2004). The firm also participated in the creation of the Global Network Initiative (Global 
Network Intitiative n.d.), and was the first to publish and regularly update a Transparency 
Report in 2010 (Transparency Reporting Index 2016).  
Twitter affirmed its belief in the “open exchange of information” on its website before 
the events (About Twitter 2011) as well as its commitment to internet freedom and freedom of 
speech (MacGillivray 2010). One of the firm’s cofounders authored a tribune describing how 
activists use Twitter and endorsing the values of peace and human rights (Stone 2010). The 
firm had put together a website dedicated to promoting uses of Twitter for good, 
Hope140.org.  However, Twitter was not a participant in industry-wide initiatives such as the 
Global Network Initiative (Morozov 2012, 22–23), finding it not adapted to its size and means 
(MacGillivray 2010).  
Comparing creed, in the form of ethical principles, corporate social responsibility 
initiatives and reporting shows that firms approached these questions differently. For 
Vodafone Group, this takes the form of reporting on corporate social responsibility and 
engaging with the Global Network Initiative, but without becoming a member in any industry 
initiatives. France Telecom – Orange also routinely reports on CSR, and is a member of the 





expression until after the Arab Spring. Compared to Google and Twitter, two firms that have 
strong, public engagement in favour of human rights, neither Vodafone Group nor France 
Telecom-Orange display strong creed. But they did have a level of engagement with issues 
related to human rights.  
 
Firm Creed 
Vodafone Group Some 
France Telecom-Orange Some 
Google Yes 
Twitter Yes 
Table 12 OSPs' creed 
 
4.3 Summary: bringing back the negative cases 
The four cases, Vodafone Group, France Telecom-Orange, Twitter and Google all 
acknowledged the events in Egypt as they were happening. If all of them did not embrace a 
pro-peace attitude, they, at a minimum, maintained business as usual. To be able to 
understand which factors influenced their attitude, it seems important to take firms that 
remained avoidant under consideration. As explained in section 3.3, these cases are Etisalat 
and Facebook.  
Etisalat is an internet and mobile phone service provider operating in Egypt through its 
subsidiary Etisalat Misr. As such, it had to follow the same requirements as others and shut 
down service for a few days, before sending government messages to its users. The firm’s 
annual report does not mention the events in Egypt, even in the section on operations and 
corporate social responsibility in Egypt (Etisalat 2012, 28–29). The firm only mentions the 
events in its report covering the first quarter 2011, in a box explaining that “political unrest 
has resulted in network suspensions” (Etisalat 2011, 20). Despite Etisalat being among the 
main foreign firms in Egypt identified on the occasion of the Arab Spring by media (Factbox 
2011), the firm did not release any statement and refused to comment (Etisalat - Investor 





available on the firm’s attitude to the events in Egypt, it is difficult to analyse its behaviour in 
light of theory. Thus, its attitude seems best described as “avoidant”. 
Etisalat is headquartered in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the UAE 
government owns sixty percent of the firm, while the remaining forty percent are publicly-
traded (Etisalat 2012, 8). The UAE did experience – and repress – pro-democracy activity in 
2011, following the events in Egypt (Howard and Hussain 2013, fig. 1.2). Etisalat has 
operated in Egypt since 2006 (Abdulla 2007, 19). The firm joined the UN Global Compact in 
2012 and published a corporate social responsibility report on that occasion (Emirates 
Telecommunications Corporation - Etisalat | UN Global Compact n.d.). Etisalat had 53,000 
employees in 2011 (Etisalat 2012, 8). The firm never refers to experiencing conflict in its 
reporting. 
Facebook’s attitude towards the Arab Spring in Egypt is difficult to gage, as the firm 
has not communicated much on the events, either at the time or since, despite being frequently 
mentioned in the media in connection with the events. Facebook was quoted on 28 and 29 
January 2011 as confirming a drop in traffic to its service from Egypt in an email statement 
and through a spokesman (El Gazzar, Vitorovich, and Bender 2011; Rhoads and Fowler 
2011). But Facebook always refused to acknowledge any role played by its service, or to 
communicate further on the events in Egypt (Preston 2011). The only sources available are 
testimonials of activists themselves. Wael Ghonim, the creator and principal administrator of 
the Facebook Page that organized protests that led to the fall of the regime recounts how his 
page was suspended in November 2011 (Ghonim 2012, 117). He and other activists explain 
how difficult it was to get in touch with Facebook and find a way so that the administrator 
could maintain anonymity (for his own security) without violating Facebook’s terms of use 
that require all users to use their real names (Ghonim 2012, 113; Giglio 2011). These activist 
testimonials show that Facebook did not seem to have a process regarding political crises of 
the type. Media mentions a director of policy for Europe, Richard Allan, who however refuses 
to react to the issue (Shapira 2011). Even though events in Egypt were quickly named 
“Facebook Revolution” in the media, the firm always refused to react publicly.  
Since 2011, Facebook has mentioned the events of the Arab Spring only once, in 
January 2018, in a blog post published in its newsroom reflecting on the effects of social 
media on democracy (Chakrabarti 2018). The post does not refer to Egypt, or to the 
company’s specific actions. Moreover, reflection on Facebook’s impact on democracy comes 





to how it was used to influence the 2016 general elections. Thus, the firm does not seem to 
have had values related to peace & human rights, at the time of the events in Egypt. 
At the time of the Arab Spring, Facebook was privately held. The firm’s initial public 
offering was completed in May 2012 (Facebook 2013, 14). It did not have offices either in 
Egypt or in the Middle East and North Africa, as its MENA office opened in 2012 in Dubai 
(Halligan 2017). Facebook does not seem to have faced similar events prior to the Arab 
Spring, and so did not have experience to build upon. The firm did not report on corporate 
social responsibility, did not publish a transparency report, nor was it part of industry-specific 
initiatives for human rights such as the Global Network Initiative. 
Bringing these two negative cases into the analysis allows me to build the following 
table, summarizing the results of my study of Online Service Providers’ attitude to the Arab 



























































Yes: office USA Yes Yes Yes 
Pro-peace, in deeds, 
indirectly, 
collaboratively; 







No USA Yes Yes Yes 
Pro-peace, in words, 
indirectly, 
unilaterally;  





















UAE No No No Avoidant 





5 Discussion  
The first section presents findings based on the results summarized above. The second section 
draws on the study’s findings to shed new light on theory. The third section discusses limits 
of this study and suggests how it could be taken further.  
 
5.1 Three characteristics explain OSPs’ attitude to the Arab Spring in Egypt 
Drawing on the table presenting the results, page 66, the first section shows that firms with 
well-established CSR policies and ethical principles are more likely to engage for peace. The 
second section shows how firms with prior experience of conflict engage more in favour of 
peace. The third section then discusses host country presence and headquarters’ location. 
Finally, the last sub-section summarizes these findings, and highlights which characteristics 
do not seem to explain firms’ attitude. 
 
5.1.1 Well established CSR policies and ethical principles are linked to more engagement 
for peace 
Based on the thorough analysis of Online Service Providers’ attitude to the Arab Spring, I 
observe that firms with strong ethical principles established prior to the events adopted a pro-
peace attitude. Indeed, the main difference between firms that remained avoidant and firms 
that displayed some form of engagement for peace – by adopting a pro-peace attitude or 
business as usual – is that the latter had at least an established practice of engaging on 
corporate social activities and reporting.  
Forms of CSR practice and reporting, and forms of expression of ethical principles 
differ from firm to firm. Two firms reported on CSR by releasing an annual sustainability 
report, Vodafone Group and France Telecom-Orange. Three firms engaged with industry-
wide initiatives, either by becoming members or by engaging with such initiatives on a more 
informal basis. France Telecom-Orange and Google were members of respectively the UN 
Global Compact and the Global Network Initiative (GNI). Vodafone Group discussed 
informally with the Global Network Initiative on issues related to freedom of expression and 





Firms routinely reporting on CSR, Vodafone & France Telecom-Orange, adopted 
business as usual, being transparent about the requests they received from the Egyptian 
authorities, and the challenge they faced, but not expressing any clear position in favour of 
peace. This seems to confirm the point raised by Fort (Fort 2014, 111) that CSR is now an 
accepted norm rather than a sign of strong engagement for peace.  
The firms with the highest level of creed, Google and Twitter, did not report on CSR 
in the traditional manner – via annual CSR reporting. Whilst Google regularly updated its 
Transparency pages, Twitter had established a dedicated website for non-profit organisations. 
More significantly, both Twitter and Google had well-established ethical principles, widely 
and publicly defended by their founders before the conflict in Egypt. This is what seems to 
differentiate between firms that adopted a business as usual attitude and firms that engaged 
for peace. Pro-peace firms engaged for peace based on their ethical principles, as shown in 
their statements: “The tweets must flow” (Stone and MacGillivray 2011) and “We believe that 
access is a fundamental right, and it's very sad if it's denied to citizens of Egypt or any 
country.” (Google updates service tracker amid Egypt shutdown 2011).  
Twitter and Google did not adopt exactly the same attitude: Twitter engaged indirectly 
for peace, either through its collaboration with Google or its statements, which remained non-
specific to Egypt. Google did engage directly for peace by criticizing the Egyptian authorities’ 
decisions to shut down communication networks. Google had also shown more signs of creed 
than Twitter, as it was a member of the GNI, in addition to its other commitments to CSR.  
The two negative cases – who adopted an avoidant attitude – do confirm that the level 
of a firm’s creed is linked to its engagement for peace. Neither Etisalat nor Facebook had 
clearly stated CSR policies or ethical principles, and both firms adopted avoidant attitudes, 
barely mentioning the events in Egypt, even long after they occurred. Thus, I draw the 
conclusion that firms which have adopted CSR norms engaged more for peace, at a minimum 
adopting an attitude of business as usual: they explained the challenges they faced, and their 
decisions.  
 
5.1.2 Positive, prior experience of similar conflict matters 
Of the four positive cases, three referred to prior experience of conflict while reflecting on 





mention prior conflict experience in their own communication on the Arab Spring in Egypt. 
Neither of the negative cases seem to have experienced conflict prior to the Arab Spring, 
based on the limited material available. 
Beyond this, evaluating whether OSPs had experienced conflict prior to the Arab 
Spring in Egypt has proven difficult. Indeed, cross-referencing academic research on conflict 
with the operations of each of the four cases confirms that all of them had experienced 
conflict before. Twitter and Google both faced challenges during the 2009 conflict in Iran, 
despite not operating in the country. Vodafone Group’s Safaricom faced post-electoral 
violence in Kenya in 2007. France Telecom-Orange also faced post-electoral conflict in 
Moldova in 2009, during which internet and mobile services were shut down. However, 
neither Vodafone Group nor France Telecom-Orange refer to these conflicts, which share 
some similarities with the Arab Spring in Egypt. When France Telecom-Orange mentions 
previous conflict experience (in Madagascar), the firm does not detail how that experience 
informed its attitude in Egypt.  
 In fact, it seems that prior experience of a similar conflict, combined with prior 
experience of human rights issues in Egypt, can have influenced the attitude firms adopted in 
Egypt. The two firms that adopted a pro-peace attitude each had experienced similar events 
earlier, during the post-election conflict in Iran in 2009. Each of these firms had also been 
confronted to human rights-related challenges in Egypt. Activists had been using their 
services to demonstrate against the Egyptian government prior to 2011, and each firm was 
aware of this, as shown in section 4.2.4.2. This confirms Oh and Oetzel’s finding (2017) that 
prior experience of conflict alone is not enough for a firm to adopt a strategic attitude in 
another conflict. Prior experience of similar issues in the same country combined with prior 
experience of conflict is what differentiates between pro-peace firms and business-as-usual 
firms.  
It is unclear whether these firms’ prior conflict experience can be distinguished from 
the role played by their home government. Indeed, based on available material presented 
earlier (section 4.2.4), it seems that the American government asked these firms to adopt a 
pro-peace attitude before, when Twitter delayed a service update during the conflict in Iran, or 
when Google’s YouTube was asked to reinstate videos showing torture exercised by the 





The analysis of OSPs’ prior experience with conflict shows that the type of conflict 
experienced by OSPs matters. Firms that had experienced conflict in which they were 
involved by parties to the conflict, who experienced positive recognition of their attitude in 
their home country, and who had already faced human rights-related issues in Egypt, adopted 
a similar attitude in response to a similar conflict in a familiar conflict – in this case, a pro-
peace attitude during the Arab Spring in Egypt.   
 
5.1.3 Host and home country: awareness of home country support and engagement for 
peace 
Among the four cases I have focused on, three were present in Egypt, and one – Twitter - had 
no presence in the country. Two of the firms, France Telecom-Orange and Vodafone Group 
had offices and other assets in the country – such as cell phone towers - whereas Google only 
had an office in the country. The fact that Vodafone Group and France Telecom-Orange had 
control of infrastructure in Egypt seemingly did not give them power to negotiate with the 
authorities. To the contrary, they repeatedly mentioned that they feared for the security of 
their employees and for the integrity of their assets, should they refuse to proceed according 
the demands of Egyptian authorities. This, combined with their pre-existing CSR policies, 
explains why they adopted a business as usual strategy: openly supporting peace might have 
threatened their employees and assets. 
The case of Google can seem to question the above finding. Indeed, the firm had in-
country employees, and one of its Dubai-based employees was arrested by the Egyptian 
services. Despite that, Google adopted a pro-peace attitude. One possible explanation might 
be that Google did not have costly investments in Egypt beyond offices, and that its activities 
do not depend on government-issued licences - as opposed to internet and mobile network 
providers.  
The fact that Google had employees in Egypt, and Egyptian employees in other 
locations, might also explain why it engaged directly for peace, and not Twitter. Based on 
Google’s communication, Egyptian employees were involved in the firm’s pro-peace 
initiatives – in particular the creation of Speak-To-Tweet. Google might have been more 





The question of the home country also allows for rich analysis. Of the four cases, two 
– Google and Twitter – were aware of their home country’s support of a pro-peace attitude, 
based on their earlier experiences with their home country government’s support of their pro-
peace activities during the events in Iran, but also while facing human rights challenges in 
Egypt. The case of Etisalat supports the idea that firms’ home country played a role in their 
attitude. The UAE-headquartered firm, owned in majority by the UAE state, remained 
avoidant. It is very unlikely the UAE would have supported any acknowledgement of the 
events in Egypt, as it itself repressed pro-democracy activism at the same period. Rather, 
Etisalat likely remained avoidant, because of its home country. 
It is less clear how the home country of Vodafone Group and France Telecom-Orange 
might have influenced their attitude to the Arab Spring, as material does not point to it 
directly. However, both firms’ home countries share democratic values, even if I have not 
found any sign of them supporting these firms’ attitude.  
Thus, firms aware of their home-government supporting their pro-peace attitude 
during prior conflict adopted a more pro-peace attitude. The firm whose government faced 
similar protests to the Arab Spring in Egypt remained avoidant. The effect of home country 
support is mitigated by the risks faced by firms with heavier interests in Egypt, who 
maintained business as usual: they were not avoidant but did not fully engage for peace 
because of risks faced by their operations in the country.  
 
5.1.4 A note on firms collaborating to face conflict  
While analysing the attitude OSPs adopted during the Arab Spring in Egypt, I have found 
signs indicating that most of them collaborated with other firms in order to face the events. 
Twitter and Google collaborated when taking action to support peace with the creation of the 
Tweet-To-Speak tool. Vodafone Group and France Telecom-Orange each adopted business as 
usual, communicating about the challenges they faced and the rationale behind their 
decisions. Studying their attitude did not show many differences between the two firms, and 
their press releases and interviews seemed to be almost simultaneous.  
This could point towards both firms discussing about their strategy together, but it 
could also be an effect stemming from the fact that material used in this research comes from 





coordination that was not necessarily there. I note however that Vodafone Group and France 
Telecom-Orange collaborated together with Etisalat on compensations they offered their 
customers after service was restored. This question would need to be further investigated, 
especially through interviews with representatives of each firm.  
 
5.1.5 Summary 
The main characteristic that differentiates between the four cases analysed in depth and the 
two negative cases is creed. Firms with well-established CSR policies adopted business as 
usual, at a minimum. Another characteristic that can explain OSPs’ attitude is whether they 
had experienced a similar conflict, during which their engagement was positively perceived in 
their home country. Finally, the dialectic between home and host country also influenced 
firms’ attitude. The case of Etisalat confirms that the home country does play a role, as its 
home country faced and repressed pro-democracy activism during the events of the Arab 
Spring, while Etisalat remained avoidant. Firms whose operations in Egypt depended on 
government-issued licenses and heavier assets did not engage for peace, while firms with little 
footprint in Egypt and support from their home government engaged for peace.  
Looking into firms’ attitude in more details shows that the two pro-peace firms, 
Google and Twitter, did not adopt the same combination of pro-peace strategies. The firm 
with the strongest creed and locally present in Egypt – Google - combined pro-peace, indirect 
action with direct engagement in words. Twitter, who was not locally present and who had a 
slightly lower level of creed adopted indirect strategies to support peace.  
Other characteristics do not seem to explain these firms’ attitude. No conclusion can 
be drawn from these firms’ ownership forms, beyond the fact that the firm mostly held by the 
country where it is headquartered adopted an attitude in accordance to its home country. No 
conclusion can be drawn from the firms’ size. Number of employees differ greatly from firm 
to firm, apart the fact that they all have more than 100 employees, the threshold beyond which 
Oetzel and Getz established that number of employees does not significantly explain firms’ 
attitude towards peace (Oetzel and Getz 2012, 179). No conclusions could be drawn based on 






5.2 Implications for theory 
In this section, I confront the findings discussed above to theory presented in the literature 
review. I first focus on bargaining-power and political risk, confirming that it is not enough to 
explain OSPs’ attitude to the conflict. I then turn to the legitimacy-based theory of political 
risk, showing that it does explain most firms’ attitude. Finally, I draw from literature on 
business and peace.  
5.2.1 Bargaining power and political risk 
Bargaining-power based theory of political risks offers a perspective on political risk based on 
the premises that firms facing political risk in a host country have investments in that country, 
or are in the process of investing in the country (Boddewyn and Brewer 1994; Oetzel and 
Getz 2012; Oetzel, Getz, and Ladek 2007; Stevens, Xie, and Peng 2016).  Based on the 
analysis of the attitude of the four firms, those that engaged most for peace, the ones that 
adopted a pro-peace attitude, had little to no investments in the country: Twitter had no 
presence, and Google had an office, but nothing more. Thus, a bargaining-power based 
approach is not enough to explain OSPs’ attitude during the Arab Spring in Egypt, as it does 
not allow for taking these two cases under consideration. It does not help understand why two 
firms with little to no investments in Egypt decided to adopt a pro-peace attitude. Indeed, the 
fact that both Twitter and Google engaged for peace contradicts Boddewyn and Brewer’s 
argument that firms that have power in the eyes of the host government will engage with that 
government (1994).  
None of the firms that had heavier assets engaged clearly in favour of peace. Vodafone 
Group and France Telecom-Orange both adopted business as usual strategies. This might be 
related to the fact that both firms had been operating in Egypt for some time, having entered 
the country in 1998, when bargaining power is considered as being at its highest just as firms 
enter a country (Stevens, Xie, and Peng 2016). Indeed, both Vodafone Group and France 
Telecom-Orange communicated on their concern over being able to ensure their employees’ 
security and being able to stay in control of their infrastructure. Both firms explained they 
were worried Egyptian authorities would threaten their employees, damage their infrastructure 
or revoke their operating licenses. In the case of Vodafone Group and France Telecom-
Orange, bargaining-power based theory does explain why both firms complied with the 
authorities’ demands (Boddewyn and Brewer 1994). It does not however explain why they 





5.2.2 Legitimacy and political risk 
The legitimacy-based approach to political risk allows for taking into account political risk 
faced by firms in the host country and in their home country with more granularity. Whereas 
bargaining-power based theory focuses on the relations between firms and host government, 
the legitimacy-based approach also takes into account relations between firms and other 
stakeholders, in the host country and the home country (Stevens, Xie, and Peng 2016). 
In Egypt, Vodafone Group and France Telecom-Orange faced a challenging situation. 
Protesters were challenging the host government that had granted them operating licences, 
and demonstrations escalated to become a conflict. Before the events, internet and mobile 
phone service providers enjoyed pragmatic legitimacy in the eyes of both Egyptian 
government and society, as the service they offered was useful to both government and 
society (Bitektine 2011; Suchman 1995). They probably also enjoyed cognitive legitimacy, 
because they had been operating in the country for a few years. But the events of the Arab 
Spring show that the Egyptian government itself had lost legitimacy in its society’s eyes, 
weakening firms’ legitimacy in the eyes of Egyptians (Darendeli and Hill 2015). By shutting 
down networks on government orders and sending regime-scripted text messages, Vodafone 
Group and France Telecom-Orange stopped benefitting local people - who could not use the 
service. They likely also lost any moral legitimacy they might have enjoyed before. Being as 
transparent as possible on their actions was likely an attempt to spare as much legitimacy as 
possible, on both government and protesters sides. 
It appears more difficult to discuss host country legitimacy for a firm like Google, 
which only had offices in Egypt, or like Twitter, which had no interests in the country. The 
legitimacy-based approach as presented by Stevens et al (2016) still relies on the 
consideration of a “host country”, for which no definition is given. The notion of host country 
should be understood as a country where a firm’s services are used, without the firm 
necessarily maintaining a presence in that host country. 
As the Egyptian authorities very early on blocked access to Twitter and Google’s 
services, it seems that none of them enjoyed legitimacy in the eyes of the Egyptian authorities. 





legitimacy in their eyes, and by extension in the eyes of Egyptian society8. This can explain 
that they decided to foster that legitimacy by defending peace and freedom of expression.  
However, Stevens, Xie and Peng’s argument (2016) that a government will not 
intervene in the operations of a firm it perceives as legitimate is contradicted by the 
experience of Vodafone Group. The firm operated Vodafone as a joint venture with 
government-owned Telecom Egypt. Regardless, the authorities disrupted the firms’ 
operations. Similarly, Stevens, Xie and Peng (2016) argue that a government will not 
intervene in the operations of a firm its society perceives as legitimate. This is contradicted by 
the cases of Google, Twitter and Facebook, whose services were disrupted by the government 
because they were seen as legitimate by society. This is likely due to the nature of the events 
in Egypt, as the government was not only perceived as illegitimate by society, but also 
threatened by society, as protesters demanded the end of the regime.  
The legitimacy-based approach calls for taking under consideration the question of 
home country legitimacy at the same time as that of host country legitimacy (Stevens, Xie, 
and Peng 2016). The question of home country legitimacy proved difficult to study based on 
the type of material gathered – firms’ communication as they published it or as transcribed in 
the media. None of the four firms mention pressure felt at home. However, the sheer number 
of media articles covering these firms in the context of the Arab Spring in Egypt shows that 
there was a lot of interest, at least in English-language media. It confirms that these firms 
faced pressure from stakeholders, and not just from their governments. 
Three of the four firms were supported by their home governments. Vodafone Group 
enjoyed the support the British Ambassador, who officially complained to the Egyptian 
authorities with regards to the regime-scripted messages the firm had to send to its customers 
(page 45 of this paper).  Google and Twitter knew that their government would support their 
pro-peace attitude, as it had done so before, in the context of another conflict, as well as in the 
context of human rights abuses in Egypt. I could not evaluate the four firms’ home country 
legitimacy further, based on the material gathered. However, the four positive cases all are 
headquartered in countries that share democratic values.  
                                                 
8  Even though not all Egyptians used these services, I consider that because of the scale reached by the 






The negative case of Etisalat seems to confirm that legitimacy-based theory helps 
understanding OSPs’ attitude in Egypt. The firm faced the same challenges to its legitimacy in 
Egypt as Vodafone Group and France Telecom. However, its home country – whose state 
owns sixty percent of its shares – faced and repressed prodemocracy activism over the same 
period. To maintain some of its legitimacy at home and in Egypt, it had to remain conflict-
avoidant.  
The case of Facebook shows that the legitimacy-based approach is not enough. Based 
on the little material available, the firm enjoyed at least the same legitimacy as Twitter and 
Google in the eyes of the Egyptian society, as its service was used by protesters to organize. 
Facebook was also blocked by the Egyptian authorities from the start of the events. Moreover, 
like Google and Twitter, Facebook is headquartered in the United States.  
In fact, legitimacy-based theory of political risk helps understand most of the risks 
faced by a firm, with the caveat that, contrary to Stevens, Xie and Peng’s argument (2016), a 
government can disrupt the activities of a firm perceive as legitimate by society or by itself, if 
the government is under threat. It does not fully explain which strategy a firm decides to adopt 
in order to manage that risk. 
 
5.2.3 Business and peace  
Research on business and peace suggests that engagement for peace is one of the strategies 
firms use to manage political risk (Oetzel and Miklian 2017). As shown above, the 
legitimacy-based approach to political risk helps understand the challenges faced by Online 
Service Providers. The four positive cases and the two negative cases all faced challenges to 
their legitimacy in Egypt. I also found that most firms – apart from Facebook – could find 
support for the attitude they adopted in their home country. Twitter and Google had 
experienced such support on previous occasions, in other countries as well as in Egypt. 
Vodafone Group and France Telecom-Orange are both headquartered in democratic countries. 
Etisalat is headquartered in and mostly owned by the UAE, who faced challenges similar to 
the ones Egypt faced.  
 Indeed, it seems that the attitude adopted by these firms proceeds at least in part from 
their need to manage political risk faced at home and abroad. This echoes Rettberg’s theory 





Factors that differentiate between the four cases’ perception of their need include whether 
they had heavy assets in Egypt, and whether they had prior experience of similar events. 
Another aspect is the question of creed, especially once negative cases are used to contrast 
findings. Creed – pre-existing CSR policies and ethical principles – is what differentiates 
Twitter and Google from Facebook. The latter remained avoidant, and had no pre-established 
strong creed, whilst the Twitter and Google each had strong creed, and each adopted pro-
peace attitude.  
Comparing Vodafone Group and France Telecom-Orange on one hand with Twitter 
and Google on the other also seems to confirm Fort’s argument that some CSR practices have 
become a norm (2014, 111). Indeed, both Vodafone Group and France Telecom-Orange had 
well-established CSR policies, but neither adopted a pro-peace attitude: they maintained 
business as usual. However, they showed more awareness of the issues in Egypt than firms 
who had no CSR policies at all and remained avoidant. Despite CSR policies becoming more 
generalized, some firms still do not adopt them.  
Although my research has not focused on the effects of the Arab Spring in Egypt on 
Online Service Providers’ profits, analysing their attitude to the events does offer a clue with 
regards to greed. The two firms that chose to adopt a pro-peace attitude, Google and Twitter, 
also took the opportunity to highlight how their services could be used in the context of a 
conflict. It seems they used the opportunity to promote their services. In the case of Google, 
the firm also communicated on the acquisition of a company, SayNow, and showed its 
capabilities. This confirms Rettberg’s theory (2016) that it is indeed a combination of need, 
creed and greed that explains the attitude adopted by OSPs in Egypt.   
Findings do dispel some expectations based in earlier scholarship on business and 
peace. Multinationals with more assets in Egypt did not seem to have influence over the 
authorities. (Forrer, Fort & Gilpin 2012, Nelson 2000). They were not more likely to engage 
for peace (Wolf et al 2007). This could confirm that focusing on extractive and other asset-
heavy industries has limited the capacity of business and peace theory to describe how firms 
in other industries engage with conflict and for peace. Alternatively, this could be related to 
the specificities of the conflict under analysis: the Egyptian authorities involved firms that 
managed internet and mobile phone infrastructure in the conflict by demanding they shut 
down their services. This in turn made it difficult for them to engage for peace without 





In fact, many OSPs repeatedly maintained that they were neutral actors, confirming 
Jamali and Mirshak’s findings that firms are mostly focussed on maintaining their activity 
through conflict, and try to avoid at all cost being associated with peacebuilding (2010). Of 
the firms that adopted a pro-peace attitude, only Google engaged directly with the conflict, 




Analysing how and why firms engage for peace cannot be dissociated from the issue of 
political risk. In order to best understand firms’ decisions, it is necessary to understand what 
political risk they face, and how they perceive such risk. Studying Online Service Providers’ 
attitude in Egypt during the Arab Spring shows that political risk faced by firms cannot be 
understood only from a bargaining-power based approach. Firms face political risk globally, 
in areas where they are not physically present as well as at home and can sometimes engage 
for peace in areas where they do not have physical assets. The analysis of the factors that can 
explain why different Online Service Providers adopted different attitudes during the Arab 
Spring in Egypt shows that it is necessary to combine legitimacy-based approaches to political 
risk with business and peace theory in order to understand how OSPs manage conflict.  
 
5.3 Limits of this study & potential for future research 
I believe I have managed to identify factors explaining why different Online Service 
Providers adopted different attitudes towards the Arab Spring. The study does not however 
allow me to weight the importance of each factor in OSPs’ decision to adopt a specific 
attitude, as I analysed a small number of firms.  
This study fills a gap in research on political risk and on business and peace in several 
ways. First, it investigates a type of firms frequently neglected in research on business and 
peace that focuses mostly on extractive industries. The study also offers to look into the 
attitude adopted by firms during conflict, which is largely missing from research on political 
risk. It also challenges political risk theories, which rely on the concept of a host country 





However analysing material produced by each firm point towards issues that would 
benefit from clarifications. The main limit of my research is that I was not able to interview 
representatives of each firm. By carrying out interviews, I would have been able to verify my 
findings, and to shed more lights on how each firm perceived the events of the Arab Spring in 
Egypt.  
Because the study’s scope is limited to the events of the Arab Spring in Egypt, it might 
be difficult to generalize from my findings. Indeed, comparing the attitude of firms during 
Arab Spring in Egypt to firms’ attitude during the Arab Spring in other countries would allow 
for richer findings, especially with regards to the role of host and home country: did OSPs 
adopt the same attitude across all countries experiencing the Arab Spring? What role did their 
connection to the host country play in their decisions? Did their home country influence 
firms’ attitude in the same way across the region?  
Beyond the question of firms’ attitude during the Arab Spring, investigating how 
online service providers react to service disruptions in other contexts would enrich 
scholarship on their responsibilities with regards to human rights. This became more relevant 
after the release of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in July 2011. 
Understanding how Online Service Providers perceive their role administrating human rights 
is relevant beyond the question of service disruption, as shown by the on-going debate around 
how their services can be used to influence election results (Etter, Silver, and Frier 2017). 
My investigation of Online Service Providers’ attitude towards the Arab Spring in 
Egypt shows that greed – the perspective of developing activity – played a role in OSPs’ 
decision to engage for peace. Looking into how the events in Egypt impacted these firms 
would offer an interesting counterpoint. Was the strategy adopted by each firm successful? 
Several years later, are they still present in the country? For those who were not in-country, 
have they opened offices in the country? Have they expanded their activities to the wider 
MENA region? Have they changed their ethical principles and CSR policies? Indeed, 
scholarship on political risk, and scholarship on business and peace rarely discuss the success 








The goal of this study was to understand how Online Service Providers reacted to the Arab 
Spring, and why. I chose to study the research question “what factors explain that Online 
Services Providers adopted different attitudes towards the Arab Spring?” In order to answer 
this research question, I studied the Arab Spring in Egypt, which made it possible to focus on 
firms’ characteristics that explain their attitude, and not account for differences from country 
to country.  
 Drawing from literature on political risk and business and peace, I proceeded to create 
a framework of analysis of firms’ attitude to the Arab Spring in Egypt. Firms can be avoidant, 
maintain business as usual or adopt a pro-peace attitude. Firms’ engagement for peace was 
analysed in greater details, to understand the modalities of their pro-peace engagement. I also 
identified firms’ characteristics that might explain their attitude: size, ownership form, type of 
service offered, location of headquarters, in-country presence, prior experience of conflict 
abroad and in Egypt, and well-established CSR policies and ethical principles. I then 
identified four cases to analyse, two mobile phone and internet access providers – Vodafone 
Group and France Telecom-Orange - and two firms offering online services and social media 
– Google and Twitter. 
 Following an analysis of each of these firms’ public communication - in interviews, 
press releases, on their websites and in their reports – I was able to identify which attitude 
each of them adopted, and to draw a table comparing their characteristics with the attitude 
they adopted. Two negative cases – two firms that refused to communicate on the events, and 
thus are considered as having an avoidant attitude – were integrated into that table, in order to 
better contrast the results. These cases are Facebook, a social media, and Etisalat, who 
provides mobile phone and internet access.  
 Based on this analysis, I find that the combination of three characteristics can explain 
online service providers’ attitude to the Arab Spring in Egypt: whether they had well-
established CSR policies and ethical principles, whether they had prior experience of similar 
conflict abroad and in Egypt, and whether they had infrastructure in the country combined 
with the support of their home country. Firms with well-established CSR principles adopted 
an attitude of business as usual. Firms that also had strong ethical principles adopted a pro-
peace attitude. Firms that had prior experience of a similar conflict abroad, and prior 





engaged for peace had little to no assets in Egypt, and their home-country government 
supported their attitude. Other characteristics do not seem to explain these firms’ attitude. I 
cannot however draw conclusions on how much of firms’ attitude each of these characteristics 
explains. Indeed, my study is qualitative in nature, and only takes into consideration six cases, 
including two negative cases for which little information is available.  
 As this case study focuses on a small number of companies, in a single country, during 
a specific conflict, findings should not be generalized beyond this specific set of conditions. 
However, they highlight limitations of political risk and business and peace theories. Each 
tend to anchor in firms’ presence in country, whereas my study shows that firms that had little 
to no in-country presence adopted a pro-peace attitude. Legitimacy-based theory of political 
risk offers an alternative, as it considers political risk faced by firms globally, at home and 
abroad. Business and peace theory, which studies the role of firms in peacebuilding, 
complements legitimacy-based theory of political risk by adding the aspect of firms’ creed 
and greed. If legitimacy-based theory of political risk explains that different firms face 
different political risks, business and peace proposes an explanation of firms manged being 
exposed to conflict based on the combination of their need, creed and greed.  
 Beyond these findings, the study of online service providers’ attitude to the Arab 
Spring in Egypt raises broader questions. What were the consequences of these firms’ attitude 
on their operations, once the conflict was over? Beyond the case of Egypt, did these firms 
react in the same way to similar events in other countries? How do they perceive their role as 
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